Animacy III
Persons: the dissolution of the subject, its convergences, and what a personalist animism must recover
I. The Target: The Substance-Self · II. The Turn Against the Subject · III. The Convergent Depersonalization · IV. Re-personalization · Glossary and Crosswalk · Thinkers in Conversation · Notes
For more, see Animacy (Part One) and Animacy II (Part Two, on Levin); this essay assumes both.
In the simplest terms: the critique of the substance-self is correct, and extending it to persons is a category error that the substance grammar itself invites. If a self is not a thing, that grammar concludes, it is nothing. A relational ontology offers a third option. Persons co-arise with the relation that constitutes them; they are neither prior to it nor reducible to it, and they can be addressed. Obligation has a grammar, someone owes something to someone, and a story told only in terms of flux deletes both places in the sentence. That is why dissolution, when it is the only story, is not merely incomplete but ethically costly, and why a movement that begins as a critique of mastery can end by converging with the depersonalization it opposes. This essay traces that arc, takes Bayo Akomolafe as its test case, and sets out what a personalist animism, one that holds animacy and personhood together, has to recover.1
I. The Target: The Substance-Self
Three terms. Three things are routinely run together under “the self,” and the argument depends on separating them. The ego is the self as conscious will and as the object of its own inspection, which McGilchrist ties to the left hemisphere’s grasping and distinguishes, after Jung, from the self proper. The self is the ground of experience, private and shared, with boundaries that are important and yet indefinite; McGilchrist, borrowing from Hopkins, calls its activity selving.2 The person is the one who can be addressed and can answer. In Hallowell’s sense, which Part One adopted, a person is not a kind of body but a social category, the sort of being with which one stands in reciprocal relation, and this is how Ojibwe speakers can speak of other-than-human persons.3
The legitimate target. The substance-self deserves its critics. It is the Cartesian ego: a bounded, unitary, self-transparent thing that has experiences, makes choices, and stands over against a world of objects. McGilchrist’s neurological review places the self’s depth, continuity, and openness to others chiefly in the right hemisphere and the self as will chiefly in the left. Plumwood attacked the same figure as the standpoint of mastery. Levinas begins from the totalizing appetite of the I. Akomolafe’s target in “You Are Not a Self” is the watchmaker, the supposedly rational decision-maker in control. The critique of the substance-self is not in dispute here. The dispute is about what follows from it.
Unselfing, rightly understood. The word is sometimes used for dissolution. Iris Murdoch’s sense is different. Unselfing is the turning of attention from the self’s consoling fantasies to the real particular, in her example a hovering kestrel, and it ends not in the loss of the one who attends but in the reality of what is attended to. Love, she wrote, is the extremely difficult realization that something other than oneself is real.4 Her unselfing is an attention to others, which makes it the opposite of an ethics of release.
Thing or nothing. What follows from the critique depends on the grammar in which it is conducted. In the substance grammar of Part One, to exist is to be a thing with a nature, so a self that is not a thing is not anything: an illusion, a story, a delusion. McGilchrist notes how quickly the claim that the self is an illusion turns on itself, since it raises the question of who is illuded and about what, and that the tendency to deny reality to the realm of experience is contagious.5 Dismantling the substance-self from inside the substance grammar yields no-self. Part Two traced the same pattern in Levin’s dualism, where a difference of dispositions is read as a difference of places. Here a difference between the ego and the person is read as the absence of the person. The pull is older than poststructuralism. An earlier essay in this series reads the mystical climax of Huxley’s Island as a fault line, a relational metaphysics and a dissolving language in the same scene, and reads McGilchrist’s alternative as transfiguration: the self taken up and not annihilated.6
The third option. A relational ontology neither rescues the substance-self nor abolishes the self. It says what a self is: a center constituted in relation, with boundaries that are real and flexible. Plumwood’s formulation, in a 1991 paper, is that a relational account of the self makes it possible to reject an instrumental view of nature and to ground respect without denying that nature is distinct from the self. She rejected hyperseparation on one side and, on the other, alternatives based on merging or on absolute difference.7 This is the position the rest of the essay defends, and the one the depersonalizing turn tends to lose.
II. The Turn Against the Subject
A short genealogy. The critique of the subject has a recognizable line. Foucault closed The Order of Things in 1966 by suggesting that “man” is a recent invention that might be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea. Structuralism and poststructuralism dissolved the author, the speaker, and the sovereign consciousness into systems of difference and discourse. Actor-network theory, in Latour’s version, extended symmetry to non-humans and replaced the subject with the actant, anything that makes a difference in a network. New materialism gave matter agency: Bennett’s vibrant matter, Barad’s agential realism, Braidotti’s nomadic posthuman subject. Haraway asked for kin-making across species.8
What the best of it keeps. The strongest voices in this line did not set out to abolish the who, and an honest account represents them at their strongest. Barad’s agential cuts produce determinate boundaries: separateness is enacted and not given, but once enacted it is real, and the one who makes the cut answers for it. Haraway’s response-ability and kin-making are ethical figures, and her sympoiesis is a theory of making with, not of dissolving. Latour’s later work multiplies modes of existence, so that the network is not the only account of what a being is. Watts and Sundberg add a decolonial caution: the claim to universal flux can itself be a Eurocentric performance that subordinates other ontologies.9
The gap in the constructive pole. What these accounts lack is a primitive place for the one who is accountable. If relata emerge through intra-action, and the cut is made by an apparatus that is itself an outcome, then the person who answers for the cut is an effect of the process she is asked to answer for. The ethics is real, and the ontology cannot hold it. A long-standing charge takes this form. Habermas accused Foucault of cryptonormativism, of smuggling in norms he declined to state, and Zak Stein describes the postmodern critique in similar terms: it is always implying a better way and unwilling to state it, since stating it would expose it to critique.10 The deconstructive moment travels well because it costs nothing to defend. The constructive moment requires commitments, and an ontology that gives persons no primitive standing cannot make them.
Reconstructive postmodernism. The same gap has been named from inside the tradition. Arran Gare and Zak Stein, among others, argue for a reconstructive postmodernism, whose heart is a duty: having taken the world apart, one is obliged to help put it back together. The cultural movement of metamodernism draws on it.11 The duty marks an asymmetry of labor. Destabilizing a narrative by critique is an unbounded, fluid task; building, anchoring, and defending a cohesive position is far heavier. McGilchrist has spent decades on the second. Akomolafe, by design and consistently with his post-activist framework, does not advance or defend a stable thesis. This is a difference of undertaking and not of sincerity. The question this essay puts to both is the same: what does the account leave standing for the one who must act?
The case: Bayo Akomolafe. Akomolafe is the most visible public voice of this line, which is why he is useful here: his work shows what the line does when it leaves the seminar. He is a trickster by method and disclaims system, so the question is not whether he has one. The question is what is lost when his account is the only one told. Three of his texts are enough to show the range.12
In “Against Worldview” (2025) his target is the consumerist habit of shopping among worldviews, which presupposes “a self outside worlding,” a sovereign chooser with clean hands. He proposes instead that our intelligibility as a someone is co-conditioned, emergent, and entangled, and that belief is not an interior possession but something distributed across weather, grammar, and gesture. This is close to the third option, constituted and not dissolved, and a fair account should say so. But the piece closes on dispossession and on the spiriting away of the self that owns beliefs. The someone it allows is never developed as the one who is addressed or who is answerable.13
“You Are Not a Self” goes further. It calls its reader deluded, without a safe core or a perceivable boundary, dismisses conscience as a defunct and Eurocentric program, and says that decisions control us. It reassures the reader that we need not steel our fences, because the doors do not open to a fierce and savage other: they “open to us.” The Other is absorbed into us, which is the reverse of Levinas’s alterity. And the text offers this as relief: we can relinquish the reins and enjoy the freedom.14
In “How to Be Available Now” (2025) the same move is applied to an opponent. The pragmatist, he suggests, may be “not a ‘person’ or ‘self’, but a weather pattern,” while the insistence on being pragmatic in the face of calamity is itself a kind of violence. The vocabulary of violence is moral, and it presupposes persons who can do and suffer violence. The ontology in the same paragraph removes them. This is not a charge of insincerity. It is the tension a flux-only account cannot resolve, and the one the next section takes up.15
III. The Convergent Depersonalization
Illich’s diagnosis. Illich understood persons as relational beings and defined conviviality as “autonomous and creative intercourse among persons, and the intercourse of persons with their environment,” in contrast with the conditioned response of persons to the demands made on them by others and by a man-made environment.16 His late work added that “life” had become an idol: an abstract, managed quantity that institutions can count, protect, and prolong, as against the person who lives it.17 The depersonalization he feared was technocratic. Persons were becoming consumers, clients, and subsystems.
The same grammar from the other side. Foucault’s own later work described the management of “life” across populations as biopolitics. Osborne and Rose, in “Against Posthumanism,” argue against the posthumanist refusal of the human on behalf of an ethopolitics of personhood: persons as constitutively embedded in material and social niches, and not isolated subjects, with a call to broaden the bandwidth of those recognized fully as persons. Their scope is human persons. The extension to other-than-human persons made here is this essay’s own, and their call to broaden the bandwidth makes it a continuation and not a betrayal.18
Third-person grammar. The two movements oppose each other in intent and meet in grammar. In Buber’s terms, each treats the world in the mode of the It. The technocrat counts a life; the flux theorist describes a weather pattern. Neither says Thou. The shift that matters is from the second person, in which a presence addresses and is addressed, to the third, in which it is described. This is why a relational tone is not enough. Latour’s networks, Barad’s intra-actions, and Akomolafe’s worldings are all relational; whether they are second-personal is a separate question. Part Two located a parallel error in the grammar of places, where a relation is described as if it were a region. The grammar of persons makes the matching point: a relation can be described without anyone in it being addressed.
The cost. When dissolution is the only story, the cost is ethical, and it is the same cost whatever the spirit in which the story is told. Obligation has a grammar: someone owes something to someone. A flux-only account deletes both places. Four consequences are visible in the texts above. First, address: if conscience is a defunct program and the Other is “us,” there is no one to owe and no one to ask. Second, threshold: if there is no fence because nothing threatens, hospitality has no threshold to cross, and McGilchrist’s clinical observation applies, that when boundaries break down people project onto others what they cannot accept in themselves, neglect their own responsibility, and pride themselves on their selflessness.19 Third, responsibility: if beliefs choose us and decisions control us, accountability has no addressee, and the structure of the claim is one that a technocracy can use as readily as a liberation movement, since it too speaks of agency distributed across subsystems. Fourth, valence: dissolution is offered as release, the freedom of relinquished reins, and an ethics of release is the opposite of an ethics of obligation. Flux talk sounds humble, which is why the difference is easy to miss.
IV. Re-personalization
Animism as personhood. The recovery has been under way for decades in the literature Part One drew on. Hallowell’s concept of other-than-human persons grew out of a conversation with an Ojibwe elder about whether stones are alive. Bird-David proposed that animism is a relational epistemology, a knowing by relating. Harvey defines animists as people who recognize that the world is full of persons, only some of whom are human, and that life is lived in relationship with others. In the accounts of animist ontologies given by Descola and Viveiros de Castro, what beings share is interiority, the condition of being a someone, while bodies differ.20 Kimmerer writes of the grammar of animacy in Potawatomi, in which the beings of the living world are not “it,” and her honorable harvest begins by asking permission and abiding by the answer.21 Each of these assumes the second person.
Relation as address. The philosophical resource is the tradition of dialogue. Buber’s formula is that “in the beginning is the relation,” and the primary word I–Thou is not a description of two things but a speaking in which an I and a Thou come into being together.22 Levinas insists that the Other is not a moment of my consciousness: the Other remains separate, and the separation is what makes the relation ethical and not a merger.23 In both, the relation is constitutive, and in both it is second-personal, consisting of address. This is what keeps the relation from being a flux. It has a structure, and the structure is that of someone speaking to someone.
The paradox of priority. There is a paradox here, and it should be stated and not avoided. On one hand the relation is primary: persons are constituted in encounter and do not precede it. On the other hand an encounter without persons is no encounter. The ontology that results is relational and not substantial, because the relation is constitutive, and it is personal and not a flux, because the relation is address. McGilchrist’s formulation is a union of division and union: the forces for union and division are not symmetrical, but they need to be unified and not divided, and the more intimately beings are united, he says in The Matter with Things, “the more, not the less, they are differentiated.”24 Nothing comes first in time. The relation and its poles co-arise, and neither reduces to the other. The monism is of the relation, a structure and not a substance, and not a substance of which persons are modes. Its two aspects are the poles that this series calls host and guest, the I and the Thou.
The field, re-read. Part One took its definition of animacy from Ingold: the dynamic potential of the whole field of relations, prior to the differentiation of spirit and substance. The worry that persons might dissolve into such a field is a thingist worry. It assumes the field is a thing, a container or a medium, so that to be in it is to be absorbed by it. In a relational ontology a field of relation is another way of saying that the cosmos is constituted by relationality, and one can no more dissolve into it than into Indra’s net, whose jewels are each distinct and are what they are by reflecting all the rest.25 Read this way, the field names the ground of potential encounter, the Tao in this series’ vocabulary, in which persons are met and from which they are not separable. Ingold’s emphasis falls on process and not on persons, which is why his line and the line of Hallowell, Bird-David, and Harvey are sometimes read as rivals. The ontology is the same personalist ontology stated at different levels: the field is the constitutive relationality, and the persons are who is encountered in it.
Selving. McGilchrist borrows Hopkins’s word for what each thing does in being itself, its thisness, the world’s drive toward differentiation, which he calls an exuberance to be delighted in and not a defect to be overcome. The self that selves is not the ego, which, in Bourgeault’s phrase in the same issue, is a good servant. The person is where the two dispositions are held and exchanged. McGilchrist notes that a hemisphere does not believe or decide, only a person does, and the picture of host and guest as positions that anyone can take fills in the rest: persons are those who can host and be guest, address and be addressed. This gives a definition that does not depend on human likeness. A person is the one who can take either position in an encounter.
What re-personalization asks. The practical test is simple. Who can be asked, thanked, refused, wronged? A personalist animism answers that the list is longer than the substance view allowed and no shorter than the human ethical tradition required. Kimmerer’s honorable harvest, Illich’s conviviality, and the needle funeral of Part One are practices of this kind. They keep the second person alive by use. And they carry the caution Part One put: that recognizing a someone does not make right relation certain, and that discernment is needed to tell an address from a counterfeit. What the flux-only story cannot supply is the someone to whom that discernment is owed.
Glossary and Crosswalk
Terms used in this essay. Where a term belongs to the depersonalizing line, the entry gives its dissolving use and the personalist reading side by side. The readings are this series’ interpretations, not the authors’.
The self and the person
- Substance-self, ego
- The Cartesian self taken as a bounded, unitary thing that has experiences and wills; in McGilchrist, the self identified with the conscious will, chiefly a left-hemisphere construction.
Personalist reading: a legitimate target of criticism, but not the person. - Self, selving
- The ground of experience, private and shared, with boundaries important and indefinite; selving is Hopkins’s word, taken up by McGilchrist, for each thing’s being itself, its thisness.
Personalist reading: the relational center that the dissolving line mistakes for the ego. - Person, other-than-human person
- In Hallowell’s sense, a social category: a being with which one stands in reciprocal relation, not a kind of body.
Personalist reading: the one who can take either disposition, host or guest, and can address and be addressed. Human personhood is a special case. Weil’s criticism of “personality” as the rights-claiming ego is aimed at something else [verify the passage in “Human Personality”]. - Second-person and third-person grammar
- Buber’s I–Thou and I–It, read as grammar: a presence is addressed, or it is described.
Personalist reading: depersonalization is a shift from the first to the second; a relational tone does not secure the second person.
The depersonalizing line
- Actant (Latour)
- Dissolving use: anything that makes a difference in a network, human or not, without a privileged who.
Personalist reading: symmetry of effect is not symmetry of address. An actant is described; a person is addressed. - Intra-action, agential cut (Barad)
- Dissolving use: relata emerge through intra-action, and boundaries are enacted by cuts, not given.
Personalist reading: the cut carries accountability, and accountability needs a respondent who is not only an effect of the cut. - Kin-making, response-ability (Haraway)
- Dissolving use: making with, across species, with ethical responsibility.
Personalist reading: the closest ally in this line, since kin and response-ability are second-personal figures; what remains is to give them an ontology. - Worlding, ecocognition (Akomolafe)
- Dissolving use: belief and selfhood as distributed across weather, grammar, and gesture; selves do not have worldviews.
Personalist reading: true of the sovereign chooser; it leaves unasked who is answerable. - Reconstructive postmodernism
- The position, argued by Gare and Stein among others, that after deconstruction comes a duty to rebuild.
Personalist reading: the constructive commitment that a flux-only account declines to make. - Cryptonormativism
- The charge that a critique implies norms it declines to state.
Personalist reading: an ontology without primitive persons cannot state the norms it implies.
The technocratic line
- Conviviality (Illich)
- Autonomous and creative intercourse among persons and with their environment, an intrinsic ethical value.
Personalist reading: a practice of the second person. - Biopolitics, “a life”
- The management of life as a quantity across populations; in Illich, life as an idol.
Personalist reading: the third-person counterpart of flux: a life is counted where a person is addressed.
The recovery
- Animacy, two levels
- Ingold: the dynamic potential of the whole field of relations. Hallowell, Bird-David, Harvey: the world as full of persons in relation.
Personalist reading: one ontology at two levels. The field is where encounter occurs; persons are who is encountered. - Indra’s net
- The Huayan image of jewels each distinct and each reflecting all the others.
Personalist reading: an image of constitutive relationality without dissolution: nothing is absorbed, because the jewels are what they are in reflecting one another. - Union of division and union
- McGilchrist’s formula for a unity that contains the division, with the forces for union and division unequal but needing to be unified.
Personalist reading: the co-arising of relation and relata; a monism of structure, not of substance. - Hyperseparation, merging (Plumwood)
- The two failures: radical separation of self from other, and the merging of self into the world.
Personalist reading: the relational self avoids both.
Thinkers in Conversation
The main conversation partners for this part. The notes give references; Parts One and Two list the others.
- Bayo Akomolafe
- Writer and public intellectual, the case study here: a vivid voice of the dissolving line, whose target, the modern sovereign self, is legitimate.
- Karen Barad, Donna Haraway, Bruno Latour
- Theorists of the turn against the subject, read here at their strongest: cuts that carry accountability, kin-making, and a plurality of modes of existence.
- Ivan Illich
- Critic of technocratic depersonalization, whose conviviality is a practice of persons in relation.
- Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose
- Sociologists who argue for an ethopolitics of personhood against posthumanism; their scope is human, and this essay extends it.
- Val Plumwood
- Ecofeminist philosopher, whose relational self avoids both hyperseparation and merging.
- A. Irving Hallowell, Nurit Bird-David, Graham Harvey, Robin Wall Kimmerer
- Voices of the personalist line in animism: other-than-human persons, relational epistemology, respectful relationship, and the grammar of animacy and reciprocity.
- Vanessa Watts, Juanita Sundberg, Zoe Todd
- Indigenous and decolonial critics who caution that posthumanist universals can subordinate other ontologies.
- Martin Buber and Emmanuel Levinas
- Philosophers of the encounter, for whom the relation is constitutive and second-personal.
- Iris Murdoch
- Moral philosopher whose unselfing is attention to the real particular, not dissolution.
- Zak Stein
- Philosopher of education, source of the formulation that the postmodern critique implies a better way it will not state.
Notes
- Part One is Animacy (Case Study XIII); Part Two is Animacy II, on Michael Levin. “Person” here follows Hallowell’s broad sense, explained in Section I, and includes other-than-human persons; human personhood is a special case of that concept. Sources marked [verify] in these notes have not been checked against a primary text and should be before publication. ↩
- Iain McGilchrist, “‘Selving’ and Union,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 23, no. 1–2 (2016): 196–213. Cited here: Hopkins’s “selving” and the thisness of Duns Scotus (p. 198); the self as the ground and not an element of experience, private and shared, with boundaries both important and indefinite (p. 199); the objectified self and the self as will as chiefly left-hemisphere, the socially embedded and continuous self chiefly right-hemisphere, and Jung’s distinction between self and ego (p. 203); Bourgeault on the egoic self as a good servant (p. 209). The paper answers contemplative teachers (Adyashanti, Almaas, Bourgeault, Welwood, Curtis Sensei) and is not addressed to posthumanism. Its note 3 observes that a hemisphere cannot be said to do what only a person can do: believe, intend, decide. ↩
- A. Irving Hallowell, “Ojibwa Ontology, Behavior, and World View,” in Stanley Diamond, ed., Culture in History (1960); Part One, note 13. Hallowell’s “person” is a social category that does not coincide with the human [verify the passage before quoting]. ↩
- Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (1970); the kestrel passage is in the essay on the sovereignty of good over other concepts, and the line on love as the realization that something other than oneself is real is from the same lecture [verify pages]. ↩
- Selving and Union, p. 199, on the claim that the self is an illusion and the question of who is then illuded and about what. ↩
- “Dissolution or Transfiguration: Huxley, McGilchrist, and the Fate of the Self,” in this series, on Aldous Huxley, Island (1962) and The Doors of Perception (1954), and McGilchrist’s “Selving and Union.” ↩
- Val Plumwood, “Nature, Self, and Gender: Feminism, Environmental Philosophy, and the Critique of Rationalism,” Hypatia 6, no. 1 (1991): 3–27, whose abstract says that a relational account of the self lets us reject an instrumental view of nature and build one based on respect without denying that nature is distinct from the self; and Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (1993). Her target is the rational, unitary, Cartesian self and the “hyperseparation” it enacts; she also rejected postmodern alternatives based on absolute difference and deep-ecological ones based on merging the self with the world [verify against the book]. ↩
- Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (1966; English 1970), closing page; Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social (2005), on actants; Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter (2010); Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway (2007), on intra-action and agential cuts; Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman (2013); Donna Haraway, When Species Meet (2008) and Staying with the Trouble (2016) [verify each characterization against the text]. ↩
- Vanessa Watts, “Indigenous Place-Thought and Agency amongst Humans and Non-Humans (First Woman and Sky Woman Go on a European World Tour!),” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society 2, no. 1 (2013): 20–34, which engages the Euro-Western frame, Latour included, and describes Place-Thought as a non-distinctive space in which place and thought are not separated; Juanita Sundberg, “Decolonizing Posthumanist Geographies,” cultural geographies 21, no. 1 (2014): 33–47, which identifies universalizing claims in posthumanist geographies; Zoe Todd, “An Indigenous Feminist’s Take on the Ontological Turn,” Journal of Historical Sociology 29, no. 1 (2016). ↩
- Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1987), on cryptonormativism in Foucault [verify]. Zak Stein’s formulation, which he attributes to Roy Bhaskar [verify the attribution], is reported in a post at Perspectives on Science and Culture from his conversation with Michael Garfield [locate the original]. ↩
- Arran Gare, Postmodernism and the Environmental Crisis (1995), and his later work on ecological civilization; the term constructive or reconstructive postmodernism is also associated with David Ray Griffin and the SUNY series on constructive postmodern thought [verify the attributions]. Zak Stein on metamodernism: see the preceding note. Further reflections on McGilchrist and Akomolafe in a forum post on the McGilchrist Irregulars list [verify the post title]. ↩
- Three of Akomolafe’s texts are used here, from a corpus of hundreds. The sample is limited. Essays on his site that appear to address ethical questions directly, such as those on Gaza and on whiteness, were not read for this draft and are the test of whether his ethics survives his ontology; a fuller study should read them. ↩
- Báyò Akómoláfé, “Against ‘Worldview,’” Science and Nonduality, 21 April 2025, scienceandnonduality.com. ↩
- Bayo Akomolafe, “You are not a ‘self’,” bayoakomolafe.net (undated; the site carries a 2022 copyright notice). ↩
- Bayo Akomolafe, “How to be available now: Sidenotes from the para-pragmatic,” 15 June 2025, bayoakomolafe.net. He describes insistence on pragmatism in the face of calamity as a kind of violence, and suggests that the pragmatist may be a weather pattern and not a person or self. ↩
- Ivan Illich, Tools for Conviviality (1973), where conviviality is defined and called “an intrinsic ethical value.” Illich’s view of persons as relational beings is stressed in Nathan Gardels, Noema, summarized at the P2P Foundation wiki. ↩
- Illich’s late criticism of “life” as an idol and fetish is discussed by David Cayley in “Concerning Life” [locate and verify the primary essay]. The contrast between “a life” and “a person” needs a primary citation before it is quoted. ↩
- Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose, “Against Posthumanism: Notes towards an Ethopolitics of Personhood,” Theory, Culture & Society 41, no. 1 (2024): 3–21, whose abstract advances an ethopolitics of personhood in which persons are constitutively embedded in material and social niches and calls for broadening the bandwidth of those recognized fully as persons. Their book Questioning Humanity: Being Human in a Posthuman Age (2024) develops the argument. Foucault on biopolitics: The History of Sexuality, vol. 1 (1976) [verify]. ↩
- Selving and Union, p. 204, on the loss of the boundaries of the self in psychosis and borderline personality disorder, the projection of the shadow, and neglect of responsibility, “all the while priding ourselves on our selflessness.” ↩
- Nurit Bird-David, “‘Animism’ Revisited: Personhood, Environment, and Relational Epistemology,” Current Anthropology 40 (1999); Graham Harvey, Animism: Respecting the Living World (2005); Philippe Descola, Beyond Nature and Culture (2005; English 2013), and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, as in Part One, note 12. ↩
- Robin Wall Kimmerer, Braiding Sweetgrass (2013), the chapters “Learning the Grammar of Animacy” and “The Honorable Harvest” [verify the pronoun proposal and the wording on asking permission]. ↩
- Martin Buber, I and Thou (1923), Part One; the formula is quoted from the standard English translations [verify the wording against the edition used]. See Part Two on the I–It and I–Thou modes. ↩
- Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity (1961), on separation as the condition of the ethical relation; Part One, notes 11 and 34. ↩
- McGilchrist, The Matter with Things (2021), the chapters on the coincidence of opposites and on the One and the Many (chapters 20 and 21), as reported in Jonathan Rowson, “Introducing the McGilchrist Manoeuvre” [replace with page references]. “A union of division and union” and the asymmetry of the forces for union and division: Selving and Union, p. 198. ↩
- Indra’s net is the Huayan image of a net of jewels in which each jewel reflects every other [verify the primary source in the Avatamsaka tradition; Francis Cook, Hua-yen Buddhism (1977), is a standard secondary account]. ↩
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