Monday, September 18, 2023

Elevator Pitch

[From a public conversation with someone who is aware of our contemporary predicament, though unfamiliar with McGilchrist's ideas and their possible relevance to it. You many notice that the word "hemisphere" is missing. It has acquired some negative connotations after a long legacy of association with "pop psychology", and this is unfortunately very hard for some people to see past. So to avoid prejudicing the conversation right out of the gate, it was avoided. Words that are not missing however include: brain lateralization (particularly noting the aspects of asymmetry and complementarity), values and valueception, clarity and narratives, and a few people: Max Scheler, George Box, F.C.S. Schiller, and Zak Stein. Please feel free to point out areas of disagreement and possible improvement.]


Person A: "The climate crisis is the product of a gross imbalance between historical industrialization and the natural world. [However] current climate solutions risk increasing the rate of industrialization, thereby exacerbating the originating problem." Source: Energy transition minerals and their intersection with land-connected peoples

Person B: It’s a real concern of course. It is not hard to point to the rise of various new ideological approaches that tend to obscure these conflicts: ecomodernism, techno-optimism, eco-fascism, TESCREALism, and so on. Meanwhile there are others who are trying to address it. I particularly find the need to reincorporate ‘values’ back into our discussions promising. Otherwise what is it all for?

Person A: I agree, we need to elevate those who are working to address these issues.

Person B: I guess I just see insufficient clarity concerning an ethical foundation upon which to build a consensus for change - whether that is for reduced levels of disruption from industrial activity, or anything else. It seems like not many people think that ethics are "real", and something that isn't real can't provide a foundation. Instead we think that "facts" provide the necessary foundation - the facts of climate and planetary health, however these are presented (as you have just now). But I don't think facts alone can provide that. We need values for a foundation, and we need these to be conceived in such a way that they are real. Iain McGilchrist notes, and it's not an uncommon observation, that today the main values are those of power and control (visible in the ideological orientations I just listed). We will never get ecological health in a society built on those values. The point isn't to merely invoke other values, the point is that we need to reconceive who we are so we can actually see them. Then the solution space expands, as well as improvements in the national dialogue, and our capacity for change. That's the argument at least.

Person A: I agree, and I feel like I've spent a fair amount of effort through my life developing my own ethical framework. I'm reasonably happy with it (though it's still evolving and imperfect.) However, I don't feel like I've ever learned how to convey that framework in a way that might be useful to others. I think that maybe speaks to the problem here - we're flailing about a bit as we try to figure out how to coordinate around ethical foundations while also stepping away from the systems dependent on charismatic ethical leaders and (often associated) religions.

Person B: I think making values real for us has very little to do with analytical thought, at least not as much as one might think it would. We can't really "think ourselves into" ethics. That said, analysis is very good at breaking large things into smaller parts, scrutinizing the pieces, and reconstructing them. It's sort of reductive, mechanistic, and instrumental, etc., and consequently very good at power and control. But we have another form of perception that actually sees things like truth, goodness, and beauty, not as a means to an end in some utilitarian sense, but as inherently valuable qualities.

That's all old information, but I mention it because what is new is that neurological research has shown that these two different "perceptual modes" lateralize in the brain; we can experimentally test this, and we see it in case studies following damage to either part of the brain, etc. The implication I'm drawing, and others have reached this conclusion first, is that this evidence suggests that axiology (values, ethics, etc.) is really not up to my subjective choice. These are objective features of our biologically endowed perceptual capacities, and in that sense they are as real, perhaps more real, than anything else we can sense.

There are other implications. One obvious one is that referencing the neurological evidence behind 'valueception' (an actual word!) is a very good way to convey the reality of values, and more importantly, to underscore the need to include them within all decision making processes. Another is that we can begin to study values and ethics in a more objective manner without the need to arbitrarily choose among the various frameworks that are currently on offer. And in The Matter With Things, McGilchrist notes that from this research some very definite patterns stand out. That provides us with a way to evaluate choices according to "which is more likely to be reliable", and which is not. ...It sounds like it should all be common sense. Don't we already know that there's more to life than power and control? Do we really need a neurological theory to tell us this? *gestures broadly at everything* I think we do. There's much more to it of course. This is just an elevator pitch.

Person A: I'm not sure I follow all of this. My own introspection suggests there's sort of a "stack of ethics" in my head. Some things - perhaps those you're alluding to here - are way down low. Being respectful of people and of nature is something that I don't particularly have a rational argument for - it just seems like a natural ethical foundation. However, as we move from that toward explicit decisions informed by ethics, I lean heavily on what I've learned about using rational thought to build self-consistent ethical frameworks based on this and other foundations. Distinguishing the simply rational aspects of those frameworks from more subjective links that I might at first argue are rational is difficult.

I've not heard the word "valuception" before, but it would seem to suggest some observations or individuals were particularly "valuceptive" - providing strong links between values and actions in the real world. What are some valuceptive observations about real choices we must make that lie in the realm of climate-responsive economic transition, resource acquisition, and the disadvantaged people of the world? To me it feels disrespectful to say that it is acceptable for even one life or one tradition to end to enable access to material resources that are likely to benefit the privileged more than anyone else. But, perhaps reflecting on a value that elevates courage, I think that we must look down the tracks and make a choice as we stand at the trolly-switch.

Person B: ...This reminds me of George Box, who said: “All models are wrong, some are useful.” And F.C.S. Schiller, who noted philosophers (and people in general) "misconceive the nature of rational action. They represent it as consisting in the perpetual use of universal rules, whereas it consists rather in perceiving when a general rule must be set aside in order that conduct may be adapted to a particular case."

'Valueception' is a translation of the German word 'wertnehmung'. Max Scheler made the analogy that our perception of value is like the perception of color, a primal phenomenon. Just as we have eyes to discriminate a portion of the EM spectrum, we have a mind that can discriminate among values. Of course there are people who are color blind or sightless, but OTOH we do not say that those who see color have a special ability. The same goes for access to ethical intuitions. Those who lack this are the exception. ...So valueception isn’t really anything new, it’s just a new word for something most of us already take for granted. The point is that today we tend to view this ability in purely instrumental terms. What that means is we tend to understand values as ‘tools’ that only serve to help us ‘get something’. For example we might say that we perceive the true, good, and beautiful because these things help us to acquire food, mates, power, social influence, etc. The alternative view is that these have inherent worth, regardless of whether they have any applications as a ‘social signal’.

This distinction appears trivial, but the implications compound with every choice we make. On the one hand we could evaluate decisions in terms of the instrumental values of power and control, you know, what the latest economic models say. But as we’ve seen, this tends to fragment our world. On the other hand, we could evaluate decisions according to our ability to perceive whether it is ‘morally right’ to do something, while cognizant of our limitations, per Schiller and George Box. But this has appeared arbitrary and subjective… That is, until the fairly recent research into brain lateralization, which has been able to more objectively examine our phenomenology and thereby contextualize our approach to values. What we find is this tends to correspond to one or the other of two lateralized modes of perception. So an individual who prefers the instrumentalist perspective on value, for example, is likely to share other features that correspond to the same mode of perception, and an individual who understands value in terms of inherent qualities is likely to share other features that correspond to that other mode of perception. There is a long list of these features.

Now let us ask the question: “Should we end one life or one tradition to enable access to material resources that are likely to benefit the privileged more than anyone else?” And what we find is that we can answer this question in two different ways, according to the salient criteria of either mode of perception. And we will likely get two very different answers and explanations for how they were arrived at. So which answer do we choose? We choose the one that is more reliable, the one that can see the whole ‘visible spectrum of the EM field’, as it were.  

I’ve barely described how the implications of neuropsychiatric research into lateralized modes of perception can have practical implications when it comes to making more reliable decisions. But I think values are a good example of one of the features of our 'perceptual world' that can illustrate the contrast between the two. They are important. Zak Stein has done great work on this as well.

Person A: I'd say "All stories are wrong, some are useful." and "All models are stories." ...To me, it seems like there are both cases where there is conflict between the value frameworks that different people have, and also cases where there are conflicts between different values within one individual's value framework. I think that at some level we all instinctively value those we identify as within our in-group over those who are outside it. However, some people also operate with an inter-group egalitarianism that can lead to contradictory conclusions.

One challenge I see in the discussion of values is that I think that unlike past implementation of socially agreed upon value frameworks, we are attempting to "figure out" what sort of universal human values are needed. Climate change affects everyone - there's not much room for the sort of provincial experiments in value frameworks that we see defining cultural differentiation through history.

Another example of conflict that I see, between values as formalized in our legal system and those that are intuitively obvious, is the association between ownership and responsibility. In our legal system, ownership of many things gives the right to act irresponsibly with those things - if you own an antique grand piano you are legally within your rights to break it up for kindling. However I think most people would be appalled by this. This gets sticky when it comes to land ownership - important for wealth and power, as well as for externalities. ...Anyway, maybe I'm still missing your core concept here - when it comes to specific examples like this, how do you see this way of conceptualizing values affecting decision making?

Person B: The core concept is that (1) evolution has endowed us with two primary modes of perception, and (2) one of these modes is demonstrably more reliable than the other. And given that (3) they display notable differences, it follows that whenever we see a conflict or problem we can (4) assess which of those responses available to us would correspond more with the reliable mode of perception, and thus (5) preferentially select that response. So to generalize, if it is a problem that is within our perceptual awareness, and if there is more than one possible response to it, then it is a problem that can benefit from this sort of assessment.

Issues such as identity politics, global health, and the tension between rights and responsibilities would all benefit from being seen through this lens. And each of these topics deserves a lengthy discussion of its own, not the least because there are existential consequences involved, as you indicated. But I think that so long as the core concept is understood, the possible applications should begin to come into view. The most difficult part of this is simply learning what the differences between these modes of perception are. And the most succinct presentation of that, which I can now recall, is a list of about twenty differences included in the introduction of The Matter with Things, McGilchrist's recent book on this subject.

In the same book is a lengthy chapter on values, which situates the subject within the neuropsychiatry. I would be very interested to hear your thoughts upon reading this, as well as the twenty differences mentioned above. And in reference to the core concept described above, it would be fair to ask: “If one mode of perception is consistently more reliable than the other, then why would evolution burden us with the other mode? Would this not be gradually selected out over time?” And the answer is that each mode is specialized for different “tasks” that are necessary for survival. So we need the other mode of perception, for example, to engage in actions that require precise manipulation of objects or ideas, etc., while the more reliable mode is far better for Gestalt perception, and so on. (This is taking us into the weeds a bit regarding the differences.)

The point here is that these are complementary, but not equivalent. So in assessing our responses to a problem, we don’t necessarily discount one or the other of them, so much as ensure that they synergistically inform each other in such a way that preferences the more reliable mode of perception. In other words, in recognizing that these are synergistic, yet productively contrast in inequivalent ways, we can better discriminate among the choices available to us, and possibly see other options that we hadn't before. This complementary view is missing in our approach to ethical problems today. The effect of this, in regard to the specific examples you listed above, is that we only get the viewpoint of one mode of attention (for example, an overemphasis on individualism at the expense of collective responsibility, and so on). Predictably, the mode of perception that predominates today is the less reliable one, leading to delusion and fragmentation of our world. Seriously engaging with that missing perspective, given what we know now, could be transformative.

Person A: Thanks for the explanation - it will be interesting to see how some of these ideas play out practically. I think that some of these things... there will be some time to contemplate possibilities, and then we will be unpredictably presented with moments - driven by crisis or political shifts - where the imperative will be on translating careful contemplation into readily accessible narratives for politicians and the public to implement. Those narratives will have to compete with opportunistic narratives that may have little in the way of a well thought-out basis, but which serve some particular interest.

On the evolutionary end - one way I think about it is that it seems really plausible that in addition to more "desirable" traits, humans have traits that are evolutionarily advantageous but are essentially parasitic against other humans. Maybe one of the most fundamental dichotomies of this sort would be the difference in the evolutionary incentive to invest in offspring between men and women. Women are fundamentally saddled with an intense investment, so it's in the interest of women to be very selective about mates, while men might be incentivized to mate promiscuously. The genetic assemblage carried by any individual benefits if their male offspring are promiscuous and their female offspring are selective, so ultimately this whole contradiction is contained in a single genome, but I don't think that the species as a whole benefits from this conflicting priority, and it may be a contributing factor for behaviors like rape.

Anyway, there are a lot of human behaviors that I think are likely related to competition between humans or groups of humans - things like ingroup-outgroup psychology, a propensity for violence and dishonesty, etc. It's for this reason that I am very hesitant to assign value to a trait simply because it's arguably part of our evolved legacy. If Evolution is your god that carries its commandments down from on high, worship with fear, not with love. …And I am interested in the book - I'm a slow reader so read very few books, but I do get through some. No promises, but maybe...

Person B: I definitely agree on the difference between research and contemplative study, on the one hand, and the practical need for more easily digestible narratives for the public and politicians, on the other. The good news, I think, is that a lot of those narratives already exist. What seems to be happening now is that we’re making connections between the contemporary research and these narratives, many of which have formerly been discredited or ignored. And that is very exciting.

Those are also very interesting observations regarding evolutionary processes that occur at multiple levels. As you note, just because something may provide a survival advantage to me or my descendants (as sometimes violence and dishonesty may appear to do) that does not mean it is thereby ethical. Our highest values tend to correspond to the broadest possible perspectives, where it is no longer just about “my advantage”. Instead, the very concept of “self” expands and begins to include one’s family, nation, or species. Or still broader: the entire community of life, the planet, etc. So it’s another example of how two different ways of looking at the same subject (value) can have radically different real world consequences. …Anyway no hurry on the book.

Person A: Thanks, I'll take a look and let you know how far I get... I am very curious to see how our societal understanding of reality and our responsibility for the future evolves over the next couple of decades. It seems likely that we will remain in a state of widespread crisis for some time to come, and that's likely to drive change. My sense is that there is actually a broad and diverse coalition that is thinking quite deeply about this, but it seems like that thought process isn't well-reflected by the political conflicts that are obvious on the surface. Maybe if I understood better how humans think it would make more sense to me...

Notes: 

McGilchrist writes, "When we are in search of truth, weighing up conflicting ways of looking at the world, we can go beyond merely stating that different views exist: we can recognize the provenance of each, and this in turn can offer possible grounds for preferring one view to another."

Philip Pullman wrote that in "The Master and His Emissary [and] The Matter With Things, McGilchrist investigates the extraordinary difference between the characteristic modes of perception, cognition and response of the two hemispheres of the brain. It’s like coming across an entirely new colour." ...Or perhaps, one might say, like re-discovering that capacity for valueception which Scheler described.

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