Tuesday, March 12, 2024

Forest Spirits, or "A theory of monsters"

'Scary Wolves' by Ramona Kaulitzki

"Every animal, in order to survive, has to solve a conundrum: how to eat without being eaten."  ― Iain McGilchrist

"The real problem of humanity is the following: We have Paleolithic emotions, medieval institutions and godlike technology. And it is terrifically dangerous, and it is now approaching a point of crisis overall." ― Edward O. Wilson

"A lack of fear leads to extinction. If your ancestors had followed the fearless, you would not exist. Humanity must learn to fear again." ― Trisolarans, Three Body Problem (season 1, episode 3)

Monsters are a very fertile metaphor, and potentially controversial as well, depending on our associations. For Akomolafe, to take one example, monsters are able to open up "cracks in the order of things through which new systems might be glimpsed" and thereby liberate us from "the tyranny of a particular plot". Here I want to look at another role that monsters may have at one time filled. I think that monsters teach us about humility. Our environment used to provide us with stark emotional contrast in the form of natural sources of fear, and these undermined any false sense of confidence we might've entertained. This is probably a fairly straightforward interpretation of the folklore and mythologies in which monsters figure - they remind us that we are not the most powerful residents of the field and dark forest (Liu Cixin). Today, modern lifestyles have insulated us from confrontation with existential threats, and as a result many seem unable to appreciate them.

Prideful boasting of one's strength and skill is generally discouraged in hunter-gatherer societies. Instead, a more humble disposition is encouraged. Why? This is not to enforce some abstract ideal of egalitarianism for its own sake, rather it has roots in the pragmatic understanding that everyone is vulnerable and survival depends on both cooperation and vigilance against threats. And notably, those external threats dwarf any individual differences in skill among group members. It's simply counterproductive to engage in internal strife when one is keenly aware of the broader context of survival challenges. (Awareness of a broader context, threat detection, and other features of psychology within an evolutionary context are correlated with the right hemisphere.) 

"Yes, when a young man kills much meat he comes to think of himself as a chief or a big man, and he thinks of the rest of us as his servants or inferiors,” one Kalahari hunter told the anthropologist Richard B Lee in 1968. “We can’t accept this. We refuse one who boasts, for someday his pride will make him kill somebody. So we always speak of his meat as worthless. This way we cool his heart and make him gentle.” Some lucky hunters don’t wait to be ridiculed, choosing instead to disparage the meat they have acquired as soon as they arrive back at camp." (Humans Were Not Centre Stage, Barbara Ehrenreich)

Early human evolution was a far more precarious existence at times, and situations could rapidly change. It was a world of megafauna, literal giants. (Satirized in many films, including "The Croods".) In the dialectical dance between man and nature, we were not the main characters. This, Ehrenreich suggests, provided us with a palpable sense of humility, which of all virtues mitigates the excesses of the left hemisphere, supplying the negative feedback we needed: "Our Paleolithic ancestors... seem to have known something we strain to imagine. They knew where they stood in the scheme of things, which was not very high." The ecological release of humans following the subjugation of these "monsters", may have then led to a growth in hubris and the subsequent phenomenological inversion that McGilchrist describes. Ehrenreich quotes one observer who noted: "Man had just emerged from a purely zoological existence, when instead of being dominated by animals, he began to dominate them."

The idea that we need a powerful adversary to learn humility, one of the greatest of virtues, is not new. It's implicit within many lines of thought. McGilchrist remarks how friction, "the very constraint on movement is also what makes movement possible at all". SC Hickman would write "Both Heraclitus and Blake surmised that without conflict or oppositional thought there is no forward movement in life or experience. We need challenges to overcome our essential stasis, our narcissistic enclosure as humans and societies." And evolutionary psychologists might argue that, insofar as we are reliably good, virtuous, and cooperative, it is not merely because we want to be, but because we had to be good. (Elevated to the notion of an eternal punishment, in some religious contexts.) If that is the case, then our restraints and frictions cannot be internally motivated alone; there must be an external environmental component as well. A lot of ink has been spilled praising the value of self-restraint, but who is praising the external constraints that we have little to no power and control over? We need these monsters. Where are they? 

"Humans coevolved with other species in Africa, and evolved as relatively insignificant components of African ecosystems. Their numbers were kept in check by predators and diseases. However, when they invaded other ecosystems - Eurasia, Australia, the Americas and New Zealand - they had devastating effects, leading in each case to vast numbers of extinctions. The only real opposition to humans came from other humans." (The Semiotics of Global Warming, Arran Gare)

With our tools in hand and our predators vanquished or subdued, we allowed ourselves to fall under the spell of the emissary, and we've forgotten the Faustian bargain that attends such acts of self deception. Gare's observation was anticipated by Robert Heinlein: “By the data to date, there is only one animal in the galaxy dangerous to man – man himself. So he must supply his own indispensable competition. He has no enemy to help him.” If Gare and Heinlein are right, this would be very bad news for us, just as it would've been for early hunter-gatherers. They knew that we cannot become our own monsters, political monsters, corporate monsters, without destroying ourselves in the process. In fact, it may be that we have these today precisely because we've either lost (or can no longer see) our original adversaries. We are inadequate to the task of restraining our ambition, overcoming narcissistic enclosure, and restoring a sense of humility. Sebastian Junger, author of Tribe, went as far as to predict that a nation will implode into internecine strife without an external enemy. The first anthropogenic crisis, the extinction of megafauna that were sources of totemic power, food, and even shelter (mammoth bone architecture), all but eliminated the original monsters. But they have passed into myth and come to represent far more fundamental aspects of life. Tolkien describes the qualities of the universal solvent (time) as a monster to which all eventually fall victim:

Bear (Emma Powell)
"This thing all things devours;
Birds, beasts, trees, flowers;
Gnaws iron, bites steel;
Grinds hard stones to meal;
Slays king, ruins town,
And beats mountain down."

There is a spectrum of these modern day monsters that still remain with us, from age, infirmity, and death, to lack of food, shelter, and other environmental constraints, to loneliness and depression, and all physical, emotional, and mental limitations. They are simultaneously our friend and foe, and come uninvited. We must look to these today and not ignore them, not necessarily with the aim to eliminate them (though many certainly should be mitigated), but to see these uncelebrated burdens as the "thorn in our flesh" that leave us "utterly undone", like the Biblical Job. Nietzsche famously wrote: "To those human beings who are of any concern to me I wish suffering, desolation, sickness, ill-treatment, indignities... the wretchedness of the vanquished... I wish them the only thing that can prove today whether one is worth anything or not — that one endures." These are the safeguards of humility and appreciation of life, in place of the predators we have lost. And like those predators, one of them will eventually catch each of us. 

Humility appears to be a disposition that one must learn or acquire through a certain quality of experience; it must be cultivated and nurtured if it is to be sustained. Few want to be humble for its own sake. Consider that evolution has created robust organisms that are healthy and fit because they encounter friction and constraints that must be overcome or otherwise evaded in order to survive. These come in the form of environmental hardships, predators, and intraspecific competition that often keeps us restless and ever on the move. Evolution will utilize all the information it has access to, but once exhausted chaotic saltation takes over, in the desperate hope of hitting upon a solution "good enough" to allow continued persistence. Some people may always appear busy for such reasons; it can be a useful strategy at times, while at other times it is less effective (cf. the idiom "run around like a chicken with its head cut off"). We are svelte and strong because we are never allowed to be fully satisfied. Likewise it may be that we become humble, and not hubristic, for the same reason. Hence, ethical systems that invert Scheler's pyramid and place hedonism and gluttony at the highest level will clearly not be very conducive to an ethos of humility (cf. Isaiah 22:13, which contrasts with 腹八分目). This is not a path that is easily followed, so it requires significant extrinsic support if one is to persist and not deviate from its adherence.

Monsters teach us that nothing can be held onto forever, despite the best attempts of the grasping left hemisphere to do so. Today we hoard belongings, memories, money, knowledge, and chase after new highs and experiences, ticking these off a bucket list. “He (or she) who dies with the most wins.” That is the ethos of power, control, greed, hubris, and projecting our legacy beyond the grave. Donna Haraway famously wrote "we have never been human", an adaptation of Latour's "we have never been modern". But still more fundamentally, we have never escaped limitation. The conceit is that somehow we have. We cannot let go of that which we never had, but we can give up the deluded belief that we, or anyone else, were ever able to hold onto anything to begin with. Letting go implies the choice is ours. But history tells us that letting go wasn't always our choice. It certainly wasn't our choice before ecological release. (Imagine what the prey of some of the most fearsome predators must consider each day.) Monsters made learning humility de rigueur for survival. Should we thank them for liberating us from delusion? Because that in turn, ironically, makes it easier to live the life we are given.

In The Master and His Emissary, McGilchrist cites research which shows that people with "right-brain deficit disorder... act fearless because they overlook the dangers inherent in the situation". And in The Matter with Things he notes that certain forms of parasitic infection can cause animals to "lose their fear" of predators the parasite must be transmitted to in order to reproduce. "Not to be astonished is not to be truly alive... to be filled with a healthful fear and awe; fear in the sense of reverence, not timidity.” The Master and His Emissary again: Plato “thought that theios phobos (sacred fear) was so profoundly moving and life-altering that the arts, which could summon it up, ought to be under strict censorship to preserve public order.” What is not a part of this? The paranoia, suspicion, and mistrust associated with schizophrenia. In a subsection titled "The Uncanny" within The Master and His Emissary, McGilchrist refers to the highly relevant work of Terry Castle. The uncanny can and should be distinguished as separate:

“Terry Castle explores the elements of phantasmagoria, grotesquerie, carnivalesque travesty, hallucinatory reveries, paranoia, and nightmarish fantasy which accompanied Enlightenment. There is an important common element to the classic loci of the uncanny. Citing Freud's famous essay of 1919, ‘The “Uncanny"’, Castle refers to: "doubles, dancing dolls and automata, waxwork figures, alter egos, and ‘mirror selves’, spectral emanations, detached body parts (‘a severed head, a hand cut off at the wrist, feet that dance by themselves’), the ghastly fantasy of being buried alive, omens, precognition, déjà vu..." I would argue that these phenomena are related to the experiences of subjects with schizophrenia – living things experienced as mechanisms, or as simulacra of living beings, the living body become an assemblage of apparently independently moving fragments, the self losing its intuitive ipseity, no longer self-evidently unique, but possibly copied, reproduced, or subtly altered; and that, accordingly, the phenomena exemplify the disengaged workings of the left hemisphere, attempting to make sense in its own terms of what comes to it from the right hemisphere, from which it has become alienated.”

Ecology of Fear

"I will face my fear. I will permit it to pass over me and through me. And when it has gone past, I will turn the inner eye to see its path." ― Frank Herbert, Dune

"Fly, you fools!" ― Gandalf (Tolkien)

The "ecology of fear" is a conceptual framework describing predator-prey relationships and the psychological impact that predator-induced stress experienced by animals has on populations and ecosystems. In "Fear of the human super predator far exceeds the fear of large carnivores", Clinchy et al. write that it "has been the subject of ever more research since this phrase was coined in the late 1990s, and numerous experiments have tested the reactions of prey to predator cues of every kind: auditory, visual, and olfactory. Audio playbacks provide the most reliable and readily interpretable means of testing the reactions of free-living wildlife to predator cues, and a 2014 review identified 180 such experiments on everything from toads to elephants."

The "landscape of fear" model derives to some extent from the ecology of fear. It asserts that the behaviour of animals that are preyed upon is shaped by psychological maps of their geographical surroundings which accounts for the risk of predation in certain areas. Or as Ed Yong put it, sounds and smells create a “landscape of fear” where "the fear of death can shape the behavior of animals more than death itself". This can produce several different kinds of effects. Oswald Schmitz wrote that “sit-and-wait ambush predators cause largely behavioral responses in their prey because prey species respond strongly to persistent point-source clues of predator presence.” This matched with his findings from earlier studies of web spiders that lurked in the grass, waiting to ambush the grasshoppers and thus scaring them into the forbs for refuge. In contrast, “widely roaming, actively hunting predators may reduce prey density, but they produce highly variable predation risk cues and are thus unlikely to cause chronic behavioral responses in their prey.” So for example, mountain lions ambush prey from specific locations like steep, rocky cliffs. Prey learn to avoid the lions’ hunting spots. But wolves hunt all over the landscape, continually moving from place to place. As Matt Kauffman noted, “Elk can’t know where wolves are, so they don’t have this preemptive behavior of avoiding areas where wolves are going to attack them. Wolves are sort of everywhere, so for an elk they are nowhere.” 

How has this changed for humans? We have essentially removed ourselves from the ecology of fear. Substantially, our fear is either nonconsentually inflicted upon each other, or sought out in controlled amounts in the form of stimulating entertainment and activities. In 1979 Yi-Fu Tuan wrote Landscapes of Fear. Can his work be incorporated with that of McGilchrist to help uncover the changing ecology of fear for anthropos, how this in turn might affect our cultural psychology, and what (if anything) we can do in response to these changes? For example, escapism into hedonic pursuits (such as supernormal stimuli) may be characterized as a dysregulated response. We are selectively ignoring long term costs, perhaps not only because there are no immediate consequences, but also because the ecologically evolved contexts associated with danger, and the cultural mythos that has grown up around these, no longer accompanies contemporary sources of risk, and so we fail to respond with appropriate respect to novel sources of danger. We have, in other words, removed the old monsters and preemptively declared ourselves free to indulge in whatever we like, however new monsters have replaced the old ones, and we have failed to recognize this. So we need to understand, attend to, and appropriately appreciate a new "ecology of fear". We need a new ecology of theios phobos in response to the external limits that we ignore at our peril. 

"While the left hemisphere facilitates acquiring material possessions, the right hemisphere comprehends the bigger picture, including awareness of surroundings and relationships... the appreciation for nuances beyond human control. This imbalance, favouring left hemisphere dominance, leads to a lack of humility and awareness of our limitations..." (McGilchrist, 2024) And that's also important given that "happiness actually comes from a sense of.. partly humility about what a human being can know and be." (McGilchrist, 2022)

What can be said about other contemporary external limitations, such as climate change? Do lessons from trophic interactions (such as predation) translate to the context of mitigation and adaptation, or RAD (resist, accept, direct) management frameworks? After all, behavioral responses can mitigate predation pressure, and animals can also make physiological adaptations to survive extreme conditions. Recall that the paradigm here is one of humility before forces we can never completely harness. So our ability to reduce negative effects by any means is intrinsically limited. The monsters are always there; the dark forest is everywhere. In this context, survival is not so much about preferentially choosing one approach over another as  realizing that, given our inherent vulnerabilities and limitations, and our contemporary psychological disposition to ignore the same (LH capture), all of these possible responses may be harder to implement than we currently appreciate. So the real challenge of climate change is to see the monster for that which it is, a threat that is more than capable of exacting a terrible toll, one to be measured in lives lost prematurely.

Stargazer (Will Soo)
Contextualizing Monsters

“The Ethiops say that their gods are flat-nosed and black, while the Thracians say that theirs have blue eyes and red hair. Yet if cattle or horses or lions had hands and could draw, and could sculpt like men, then the horses would draw their gods like horses, and cattle like cattle; and each they would shape bodies of gods in the likeness, each kind, of their own.” ― Xenophanes

"This human form is limiting." ― Anonymous

When we become our own monsters, we are "left hemisphere monsters". Whereas the megafauna were not; those ancient beasts were in balance with the paleolithic ecosystems they lived within. They did not share any of our psychological pathologies, though we did share a distant common ancestor. When we become our own monsters, we normalize abusive relationships and social systems, destroying ourselves and our communities. The billionaire "doomsday bunkers" in vogue among super-rich "preppers" today are LH metastases of RH intuitions. Dictators deceptively promise protection and liberation, but only seek their own benefit and use legal systems as a tool toward that end. In a conversation with Ameer Shaheed, McGilchrist noted that “narcissistic and psychopathic, as well as probably borderline personalities (cluster B spectrum, the so-called 'dark triad'), can be enormously manipulative and deceptive. These people play an undue role in forming our society. They are effectively predators and they tend to prey on individuals from other categories (cluster C spectrum). There are far too many such people in positions of power today. Perhaps there always have been. And that's one of the problems about having systems of power. We can't trust them to mold our futures. They will always present something which is a disaster as something for our benefit.” When we lose a sensitive awareness to the deception and misdirection of monsters, of any kind, we more easily fall into their traps and snares.

This is in sharp contrast to the evolutionary context that Ehrenriech was describing, the context that had prevented us from having too much vain pride for millenia. The monstrous and imposing megafauna were legitimate, ecologically evolved sources of power, and they had something of the "sense of the sacred" about them. The difference is how power is acquired, how it is maintained, and to what ends it serves. Megafauna deserved our respect. People respect sources of power, even if this is only by necessity. But if we respect dictators, our modern LH monsters, and think that these are necessary, then we may never escape LH capture. Megafauna were a force of nature in a way that political and corporate monsters are not. In his article "What is it like to be a man?" Phil Christman wrote that 'protection' is central to the concept of masculinity, but this basic value has become twisted and deformed in a contemporary culture where the answer to the question "How does one actually protect?" is no longer as straightforward as the collective mythology we've inherited might suggest it should be. And as Pankaj Mishra pointed out, "The sad reality is that, by and large, the gravest forms of risk men face today are not the sort of threats that can be diffused with muscle strength... Risk management in the modern world takes brains, not brawn." 

To the extent we can speak of "attractors" we may also speak of "repellers", and contrast "landscapes of eros" and supernormal stimuli, characterized by food, shelter, and reproductive opportunities, with "landscapes of phobos", characterized by threats to, and loss of, the same. Such landscapes clearly overlap the same geographical space. For example in a marine environment the sounds of snapping shrimp may attract reef organisms to colonize a patch of seafloor, or freshwater turtles coordinating their emergence from the nest (see Karen Bakker), while the sounds of killer whales may cause great white sharks in the region to flee in terror. These semiotic landscapes, and how they are connected to processes such as "trophic cascades" where even monsters have monsters, have been the focus of work by biosemioticians like Yogi Hendlin and others. 

Just as attractors may be revered and sacred, so too I think repellers are held in awe. The difference isn't always clear, as they can be united in a single being. Nietzsche famously wrote "He who fights with monsters should see to it that he himself does not become a monster. And if you gaze long into an abyss, the abyss also gazes into you." Many contemplative religious traditions, in a similar vein of thought, urge practitioners to maintain an awareness of their "imperfect, impermanent, and incomplete" nature. These can be deeply troubling thoughts for children. But at some point each of us must face our mortality. It can be a shocking realization, but necessary for healthy psychological development (and approach-avoidance conflict). This, I think, is "theios phobos", which intersects with Hoffmeyer's notion of a semiotic web. It is a component of that web, and one that we have lately neglected. Instead of focusing on the rhetoric of self-restraint or positive goal achievement, this direct confrontation with reality can shock us, like the Zen katsu, out of our apathetic complacency. Zen masters sometimes use a loud shout to push a disciple beyond the web of discursive and analytical thought. As Linji said, "sometimes a shout is like the golden-haired lion crouching on the ground," lying in wait for its prey, a symbol of awesome strength and power. In Ch'an and Zen Teaching, Charles Luk explained that "all wild beasts are scared of the lion... likewise, Lin Chi's shout 'scared away' all perverted views held by his disciples." 

The method of Katsu might be contrasted with something Denise Levertov wrote: "I do not believe that a violent imitation of the horrors of our times is the concern of poetry. Horrors are taken for granted. Disorder is ordinary. People in general take more and more “in their stride” — the hides grow thicker. I long for poems of an inner harmony in utter contrast to the chaos in which they exist. Insofar as poetry has a social function it is to awaken sleepers by other means than shock." Shock alone does not wake us up, it is the awareness of our limitations that does. So while a shock may help us to see these limitations, perhaps their realization only crystallizes when we are allowed a moment of quiet reflection. This is what Kepler aimed to do with his book "The Dream", where the awesome forces within the solar system, and our limited capacity to comprehend them, were simultaneously revealed through the poetics of science, aimed at awakening.

In the film Everything Everywhere All at Once, the antihero Joy, having escaped embodied limitations, might be a kind of accidental LH monster. Having been pushed by Evelyn to become unlimited, and inhabit all multiverses simultaneously (which George Gillett, taking inspiration from Wendell Berry's "Why I Am not Going To Buy A Computer", suggests may metaphorically represent the virtual environments of the Internet generation) life is drained of meaning for Joy. Meanwhile, when "you are living your worst you", or in other words are extremely limited by comparison, you see meaning in the smallest acts of kindness. Eventually the lead characters "champion acceptance rather than limitless possibility, and belonging rather than unrestrained freedom. They find stability in unpredictability, and find meaning in an imperfect world." In the same way, the landscape of fear might remind us of our limitations and thereby awaken us to meaning when we are able to psychologically integrate these limitations rather than deny or try to escape them. By comparison, aspiring to have godlike powers for ourselves or others can drive us first to alienation and eventually to nihilism. Which isn't to say we shouldn't discriminate between which limitations are legitimate and which limitations are themselves illusory. The film Nyad is an excellent example of that latter category, and how it can be healthy to push ourselves past the limitations that only exist in our minds, or by convention, and do not exist in reality, while still recognizing the monsters, in this case sharks, jellyfish (not telescopefish), and vagaries of the weather, that must be respected along the way. 

Urutau (photo: Alessandro Abdala)
Art and Culture

"Doesn't everything die at last, and too soon? Tell me, what is it you plan to do with your one wild and precious life?" — Mary Oliver 

"Even death, which on an individual level is a supreme disvalue that brings an end to sentience and the actualization of values by the individual who succumbs to it, has value for the species, community, and, it has been argued, even for the individual." — Sanford Drob, Why Existence?

“For a good apple pie you need both tart apples and honey, both sourness and sweetness, not just apples that are bland.” — Iain McGilchrist, TMWT 

Any culture that recalls the early evolutionary context in which its phenomenology had its origin may preserve it through the prevailing folklore, ethos, and aesthetics, the song and dance. Various games and sports recapitulate trophic interactions (ie. sharks and minnows) and valorize the ability to quickly outwit and outmaneuver opposing players. The industry that has grown up around it with slogans like "just do it" reflect this as well (contrast with "analysis paralysis"). The Pamplona running of the bulls is famous the world over. As for songs, in his now timeless "Teddy Bears Picnic", Bing Crosby combined our fascination for bears with a sense of eerie otherness. We simultaneously love and fear them (a common aspect of our relationship to the monstrous). I remember how Jeff Verge described bears and the human imagination following his encounter in 2022, as an "ancient bond", a "spiritual connection", a "primordial eternity" in "shamanic union" among the grandeur of "stone cathedrals". 

We might conceive of a spectrum of "astonishing agency" from that which exhibits union (reverence and humility, theios phobos) to that which exhibits division (fragmented, uncanny, delusional). Tolkien incorporated Norse folklore into modern classics of fantasy literature (as well as the disembodied Eye of Sauron), Lovecraft captured the sense of dread one feels when straying too far from the familiar in his Cthulhu Mythos, Edward Gorey's illustrations, like gargoyles adorning cathedrals, allowed imagination to take over, as Theodor Kittelsen's images of trolls (Skogtroll, 1906) did a generation before, and Erwin Chargaff wrote poetically of the “fertile night”. Some animals with raptorial appendages, such as the Amblypygi, or Phyllocrania paradoxa the ghost mantis, appear fantastic enough already, as does "ave fantasma". The Noh plays of Japan terrify audiences with hannya masks as much as the Godzilla franchise terrifies us in theatres, while Miyazaki's fully embodied Forest Spirit and 神獣 enchant us with magical realism. The Japanese idiom 弱肉強食 means "the weak are meat the strong do eat." Which of these invoke greater union, which invoke division?

The modern entertainment industry has served up clever monster films like the Aliens, Predator, and Tremors franchises, and portrayed archetypal creatures such as the gmork of Die unendliche Geschichte. There is a real desire to hear and tell scary stories. The rugged primitivist or survivalist is an enduring aesthetic, more recently promoted in film and media by figures like Paul Hogan (Crocodile Dundee films) and Luke Nichols (Outdoor Boys channel). These aesthetics and motifs are worked and reworked to remind us not to become too proud, confident, and certain about anything. As Ehrenreich wrote of the early humans, "they knew they were meat, and they also seemed to know that they knew they were meat – meat that could think. And that, if you think about it long enough, is almost funny." ...How much emphasis we lay on "almost" is going to depend on the context, of course. In the film The Matrix, the character Morpheus talks about understanding the cause, the source of constraints, and not just remain perpetually stuck in crisis management addressing symptoms. "When you're ready, you won't have to", he says. One possible takeaway from this is that the meta-awareness of monsters, whose existence we've generally forgotten or can no longer see, has the capacity to enhance our overall evolutionary fitness. Recall the psalmist: "Yea, though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death..."

Luke Combs' song "Even Though I'm Leaving" has some very poignant lyrics. It mentions the fear of being alone (and of literal monsters), of going off to war, and of losing a parent. That's some very heavy, gut wrenching stuff. Those are things we have all been, and maybe still are, afraid of. I think each of these - the unknown, conflict, impermanence - can be metaphorically subsumed into the category of "monsters". We, as intrinsically social beings, do need the consolation that we don't have to face these things alone, and that despite it all we have each other to lean on. Children need reassurance that they aren't alone. And above all else, parents want to protect them. We can't eliminate the monsters that they will face in life, but we can make them manageable, and meet them together. It's part of the challenge of life to come to terms with this aspect of the coincidentia oppositorum, without ignoring it altogether. Monsters, fear, pain... all is as it should be. That said, I do think those monsters we've created or exacerbated out of our own greed and foolishness, such as territorial disputes and environmental destruction, can and should be all but eliminated. The fact we still battle these to such an extent as we do today is, I think, in part due to ignorance of who we are. And that's the very question which Plotinus asks and McGilchrist addresses.

We've only begun to explore the art, music, and practices of a culture that dances with monsters. It's not just the music of Bing Crosby and Luke Combs, or the books of Tolkien and Maurice Sendak, or the Katsu of Zen, but also the art and traditions that we don't normally think of as addressing these themes, and yet somehow do anyway. What does yoga have to do with any of this, for example? Why might music, dancing, and mythic narratives mesmerize monsters, at least just long enough for us to live to see another day? Have we forgotten these metaphorical skills for navigating the approach-avoidance landscape of reality, a landscape that the hemisphere hypothesis itself offers a process-relational way of talking about? As the character Ian Malcolm says in Jurassic Park, “Your scientists were so preoccupied with whether they could, they didn't stop to think if they should.” (Cue the Jurassic Park film score.) I would note that it was only after the dinosaurs were brought back did this even cross their mind. But whether or not they were brought back may be less important than whether or not the lesson is learned, and humans have shown via cultural evolution that we can learn vicariously from the past experiences of others. 

Life may not be exactly a hero's journey, or more precisely, that journey may be more about realizing our radical vulnerability to other agents in our environment, and simply avoiding the most menacing of them at all costs. In Life’s Hidden Resources for Learning (published in Arran Gare's journal Cosmos and History in 2008), Philip Henshaw argues that "resourceful avoidance of conflict is the dominant behavior of stable natural systems", that this has been the engine of evolution, and that avoidance can involve both questioning and redefining problems to allow us to better avoid a head-on confrontation, while never completely eliminating the (dis)advantages of our finite natures. As discussed, biologically evolved agents such as ourselves are incentivized to succeed and avoid failing, and this requires the deployment of asymmetric forms of attention. Asymmetric precisely because of the qualitative differences between the "pathways to success" versus the "pathways to failure" relative to the agency of the organism. If agents disproportionately attend to the "pathways to success", then they risk being blind to the more numerous "pathways to fail modes". One might recall that it is the apparent failure of life to permeate the cosmos (the "great silence") that has inspired numerous explanations including a "dark forest" (cf. dark ecology, dark mountain) and "great filter", two paradigms that make failure modes increasingly likely.

Causality "pulls" us ever toward the future. As John Deely wrote "the future beckons the present", or as Rosen said, models pull "the future into the present". The theoretical neuroscientist Karl Friston wrote that "beliefs about outcomes in the distal future influence beliefs about states in the proximal future and present. That these beliefs then drive policy selection suggests that, under the generalised free energy formulation, (beliefs about) the future can indeed cause the past." And so while values pulls us ever forward, the fear and anticipation of impending constraints that threaten their fragile realization pulls and pushes us to act as well. 

Lair of the Sea Serpent, Elihu Vedder
What is a "fantasy aesthetic"? I recall reading how "solarpunk" (ca. 2008) borrowed elements from utopian and fantasy genres. Thomas Kinkade called himself a "painter of light", perhaps a "painter of darkness" would compliment his work. In the aesthetic of fantasy, a weather-worn and rough exterior will often conceal a warm and tender interior, a recapitulation of the surface/ depth paradigm that McGilchrist frequently refers to. I wonder if this can help flesh out the evolutionary psychology aspects of the hemisphere hypothesis that McGilchrist only cursorily addresses in his books, and the possible implications for axiological design, as outlined above. Of course, forest spirits are more than just an image, but a non-visual sensation as well. A smell, a sound, maybe a taste. A presence. There’s an evolutionary reason we fear the dark. But the artwork of Frank Frazetta, John Bauer, and Brian Froud (who provided the inspiration for the "urRu") can help give that presence a visual representation. Recall Obi-Wan Kenobi: “I felt a great disturbance in the Force, as if millions of voices suddenly cried out in terror and were suddenly silenced. I fear something terrible has happened.” I may try to get back into sketch drawing (which may have a crossover with learning Japanese pictograms as well). I was thinking of drawing family members, buildings, emotions, scenic landscapes in this imaginal genre/ aesthetic of "theios phobos" that I'm describing here, to get a better sense of what it might look like in practice, and what it can tell us about the spiritual, as McGilchrist seems to imply it might. What should every survivalist, thus inspired, carry with them? One may want a warm and cozy home of timber and stone, but may need to settle for warm and cozy clothing of leather and wool in a cold and damp bivouac instead.

To restate what is probably the thesis behind the metaphor here, in an evolutionary context, humility means giving up the deluded belief that we, or anyone else, were ever able to hold onto anything to begin with. And furthermore, it involves realizing that whatever we do manage to hold onto can easily be taken from us, regardless of whether we choose to let it go or not. In short, we (the subject) never had it (the object), and moreover, it cannot be had by us. The conceit or delusion is that we do, or that we can. Disclosing the deception here is "thinking against thinking" (Heidegger), it is the realization of true humility, of the vicarity of our "one wild and precious life", to quote Mary Oliver's poem, The Summer Day. All is incomplete and impermanent, and all the more (not less) beautiful and precious because of this. We should value and listen to those messengers who are bringing this to our attention. And I believe that some of them are speaking to us from deep time through artistic expression, those paintings preserved on the walls of caves for millennia. 

The combination of environmental conditions capable of both conferring affordances and imposing limitations (trophic interactions that produce approach-avoidance landscapes), with an interpretive lens capable of contextualizing our relationship to these (neuropsychology of the hemisphere hypothesis), is critical to the balance of hubris and humility. The relationship between our minds and the predators and prey, external threats and resources, etc. within our environments produces the complex neurology, and consequences of that neurology, which we observe today. Constraint and interpretation needed to occur together in embodied forms to get us to where we are now. Having eliminated or domesticated the predators and tamed or ignored the remaining threats, such that all has become to us merely prey and resource, we easily become blind to the potential of higher constraints, risk forgetting the lessons they once taught, forget our humility, cease to be antifragile, and ultimately we are setting ourselves up for a much deeper and longer lasting collapse. So whether or not we can recover a sense of humility, of theios phobos to better sense the terrain of life, may have existential implications. 

Belonging to a cohesive social group, belonging in the natural world, and belonging in the spiritual world are the three things that make us fully human and fulfilled, per McGilchrist. And so these are the areas in which we must recover our humility. One might become something of a Walter Mitty, adopt some of the arts and customs of those who embody this best (Zak Stein's axiological design for theios phobos), tend to the fermentation of one's food, and recount the old myths (while leaning against a shillelah). ...We have never left the forest's edge, and the startling agencies that shaped our evolving psychology are still with us. This is the evolutionary context in which our sense of the sacred developed. How these sacred agencies are viewed, according to our bihemispheric psychology, may be a key implication of McGilchrist's hypothesis. He concluded his Epilogue with reference to the unique brand of crypto(zoological)-theology he developed: “It is our duty to do the more difficult thing: to find out the core of wisdom in [what cultures wiser than ours were trying to express by speaking of God].” Ehrenreich is pointing to the loci of this in the raw powers of implicit nature. And animistic cultures, such as those of contemporary Japan (in folklore, art, and cinema), as well as those who find their influence overwhelmed by the zeitgeist of our era (indigenous traditions both East and West) express these aspects well. I believe this is the evolutionary context in which our sense of the sacred developed, a topic McGilchrist seems to have left under explored within his work. 

"There's always a bigger fish." - Qui-Gon
Trophic Cascades: The Three Body Solution

"Tomorrow is promised to no one."

"伝道者は言う、空の空、空の空、いっさいは空である。" — Ecclesiastes 

An alternate title for this article might be "The Three Body Solution: Iain McGilchrist and Evolutionary Psychology". Here the "three bodies" refers to the trophic interactions between a species, that which it predates upon, and that which predates upon it. Somewhat relatedly, Stanley Salthe introduced an independent notion of the triadic system, where there is a focus on the system as both 1) a whole above the levels below and 2) a part belonging to another level above, while not forgetting 3) the level of the structure itself in between. In a food chain/ pyramid, that which targets me with its left hemisphere I am scanning for with my right hemisphere, while with my left hemisphere I am targeting something else, and the chain goes on. In just this way, while our distant ancestor Australopithecus afarensis may have occupied something like "position C", and thus had very clear environmental pressure to exercise the capacities of both hemispheres, today we might say we are in "position A", at the top of the food chain (see illustration), from which we can manipulate everything else. So while we have a lot of positive reinforcement for a hyper-developed left hemisphere mode of attention, where is the negative feedback needed to develop the sense of humility associated with the right? The answer, I fear, is that there isn't a whole lot; our monsters have been either tamed or exterminated. A relatively fast ascent up a trophic cascade may have led to an inversion of hemispheric priority with dramatic consequences for cultural psychology. 

It may be objected that, due to extreme social inequality, the majority of humans may more accurately identify more with the 'worm' in the diagram than the apex predator at the top. And indeed Barbara Ehrenreich, who also wrote Nickel and Dimed, would entirely agree with this. There are several possible responses to this objection. The first is that we can further develop this simple model to suggest that all humans might be represented as the metaphorical ‘cells’ within the body of the ‘big fish’ (apex predator), with some cells occupying a more privileged position relative to others, yet all are still part of the same body at the top of the trophic hierarchy relative to other animals, who are our evolutionary cousins after all. And because we are all collectively at the top despite these differences, many people today see themselves as "temporarily embarrassed millionaires" (John Steinbeck), while others have bought into some version of the "prosperity gospel". In other words, despite our differences, we identify with the most privileged members of our tribe, a tribe that is also thoroughly captured by the left hemisphere. And lastly, even if some of us are not deluded in this way, we are nonetheless the unwilling victims of social structures that are designed by those with a (necessarily) limited understanding, and sustained by those who may be deluded and/or motivated to perpetuate economic bias. All this follows (I would suggest) from an evolutionarily rapid ascent during which we displaced the former keystone species to become a new "hyperkeystone species". An ascent too fast for us to achieve ecological, psychological, or cultural balance in the same manner in which other species have, to the extent such a comparison is valid. Yet here we are today. So what happens next? Either greater fragmentation, or greater integration of right hemisphere qualities including greater recognition of our limitations and that which is easily neglected (the shadow aspects). Contrary to the optimism that is sometimes displayed by Michael Levin, we cannot be sure which is more likely. One might point out that 'cosmic teleology' favors our response to values, and so we should be optimistic. But there is no timetable according to which this plays out, and so I do not think we can rely upon it to prevent a disaster on any scale from occurring. The existential stakes remain high. 

Our intuitions regarding responsibility were articulated by my friend Yogi Hendlin in "I Am a Fake Loop", a paper he wrote several years ago: "in sociology, the term "responsibilization" captures the buck-passing that corporations and other entities commit, displacing their responsibility as producers and marketers of unhealthy things and ideas and instead shaming overly-indulgent consumers." Relative to the influence of entities such as these, we are the worm. Another possible way that we are worms has been frequently mentioned by Daniel Schmachtenberger and occasionally Jonathan Rowson: We are all caught in multi-polar traps set by the "game theory monster" termed "Moloch". What this points to is the possibly counter-intuitive conclusion that, while humans are a hyperkeystone species, each individual human is not responsible for this state of affairs. This is the "part-whole relationship" McGilchrist references. If all of us are collectively responsible but none of us are individually responsible, what do we do? I think we have to be able to see both the parts and the whole at the same time. For example, Elinor Ostrum saw social-ecological wholes, and a way to tame Moloch. But if all we see are parts, then maybe monsters like Moloch will remain undefeatable, and largely invisible to us.

Systems thinkers should be able to see the wider implications. But anyone who considers the multiple definitions of monster can see that there's a lot to consider here. Today few people may have a phobia of being ambushed by a leopard at night, but many of our distant ancestors perhaps did (and justifiably so). Nonetheless there do remain many other things that could still disrupt our sense of equanimity. The problem is that whereas the leopard was palpable, contemporary threats are often more complex and less tangible. The challenge is to learn to sense these as clearly as we might've sensed a leopard hiding in the grass, and recover that humble self awareness in relation to such threats. This is individually and culturally protective, and has many co-benefits. 

Virtual reality is similar to the metaphor of a "hall of mirrors". It is a model within which all one can see is what the model itself permits one to see; it is a tool that is limited by the approximation of reality upon which it is based. It is not itself reality, and thus it is not capable of disclosing the full truth. If one were to imagine that virtuality is reality, then one would be deluded. Here I'm suggesting that a relatively fast ascent up trophic levels can decrease our sense of humility, and thus lead to an inversion of hemispheric priority, with dramatic consequences for cultural psychology. And in contemporary society we've seen the effects of the distorting influence that a rapid "rise to the top" can have on psychology. Elizabeth Spiers, a former editor at the New York Observer, famously described Jared Kushner, son-in-law and former advisor to President Donald Trump, as someone unable to empathize or understand other people's grief. Recall McGilchrist noting that "narcissistic and psychopathic personalities play an undue role in forming our society; they are effectively predators. There are far too many such people in positions of power, and that's one of the problems about having systems of power." Now we can put the picture together: a rapid rise up the power hierarchy (trophic level) correlates with LH capture, which in turn correlates with mistaking the map (virtual reality) for the terrain (reality), and hence we would expect that a society living under the influence of a LH insurrection would be living more within maps and models (simulations) than attending to the living terrain of life. One might mention all the other consequence of LH capture as well, but we are familiar with many of these already. 

It's been noted that domestication can result in both decreased brain size and less fear of predators and environmental threats. Have humans domesticated themselves? There might be some equivocation between domestication and what may otherwise be simply the evolutionary effects of an increasingly complex culture and society. There are many variables to consider, some drive a reduction in brain volume, while others (like greater access to easily digested food) may promote an increase. A recent study of domesticated dogs showed that changes in brain volume can partially reverse, at least in some situations. The thesis I'm advancing here is a further development of the hemisphere hypothesis proposed by Iain McGilchrist, which states that each hemisphere provides us with a unique perspective on the world, and we are more likely to preferentially attend to one or the other perspective according to the situation in which we find ourselves. So if we find that we are living a precarious existence, and have good reason to believe we may die tomorrow if we aren't aware of our vulnerabilities (whether these are related to food, shelter, or predation), then we will want to pay attention to the perspective that reminds us of our limitations. If extant hunter/gathers must likewise live with a constant awareness of their vulnerabilities, then they likely benefit from the other protective qualities provided by the same perspective. In the artificially controlled environments produced by contemporary globalized Western culture, those situations are encountered with less regularity, the corresponding perspective is generally derogated, and thus the protective qualities associated with it are largely lacking. 

The lyrics to "Enter Sandman" by Metallica run "Hush little baby, don't say a word. And never mind that noise you heard. It's just the beasts under your bed. In your closet, in your head." A hungry crying baby might attract predators and put everyone in serious danger. And so it might seem like a poor adaptation for survival. But studies show that the loud squawks of a hungry young pied babbler (Turdoides bicolor) in the Kalahari Desert can effectively blackmail the baby bird’s parents into feeding it pronto, before predators also hear their cries. So basically, the young babblers intentionally put themselves at risk to force their parents to pay attention to them and get them some grub. The fledglings would even move from the trees to the ground when driven by hunger. (See Amotz Zahavi and "signal selection".) ...And so, while sometimes monsters are a "multispecies assemblage" (in the metaphor of Bayo Akomolafe), at other times they are just the beasts hiding in the grass, waiting for a hungry baby that tragically miscalculated the devotion or resourcefulness of its parents. When Simon says we have two years to save the world (Simon Stiell), maybe the metaphor to reach for is those fledglings squawking on the ground. Simon says be afraid. And if you are among those with the power or resources to act, that might not be a bad idea right about now. Note: the strategy doesn't work if the predators can't be unwittingly enlisted as accomplices of the baby birds. 

When one thinks of moments of peak experience, our best memories, surely these involved as Matthew Olzmann wrote in his poem "Letter to the Person Who Carved His Initials into the Oldest Living Longleaf Pine in North America", such things as standing "on the precipice of some wild valley". (In fact, this morning I dreamt of standing on the edge of Waipi‘o valley.) And, if prompted, most people would probably not conjure images of disembowelment by a fearsome predator, or seeing family members swept away by a sudden tsunami, or any such similar confrontation with the more fearsome and uncontrollably animistic side of nature, those aspects that civilization has sought to tame and subdue first. Surely nature doesn't need to actually kill us in order to be, as Olzmann wrote, "primordial and holy". But an awareness that we have not always been an exception to the same constraints and trophic interactions that dominate the lives of the other beings with whom we share the planet, that was at one time extremely important to us. Our daily concerns, and our awareness of our vulnerabilities, have changed dramatically since then with perhaps far reaching impacts. One might note here that the awareness of value, such as surveying miles of verdant forest, soft beaches, and azure sky and ocean while standing above a valley, and the awareness of disvalue, such as capture by some agency capable of ending our life, are not actually exclusive. Nor must the potential for disvalue be actualized to confer the proposed benefit, but it must be somehow psychologically salient. As I've suggested elsewhere, it may be that our capacity for appreciation of what others have called "positive value" is actually increased by, or indeed enabled by, an awareness of our vulnerability. This is related to the sort of existentialist gravitas captured by concepts like mononoaware, the pathos of things, and dukkha, the unease of life, although the possibility of sudden death (especially when premeditated by a predator) can elicit a far more visceral and sobering reaction that is almost impossible to deny or rationalize away. ...What does it mean to be humble?

Addenda:

• McGilchrist with Alastair McIntosh: "The poet Gerard Manley Hopkins wrote wonderfully about wildness and wilderness and how important it is to us. And I don't think we understand this. Being wild, untamed, undominated by the human spirit is very, very important." [link].
• Thomas Babington Macaulay’s lines from Lays of Ancient Rome: "Then out spake brave Horatius, The Captain of the Gate: “To every man upon this earth death cometh soon or late. And how can man die better Than facing fearful odds, For the ashes of his fathers, And the temples of his gods?" (See also Nemean lion.)
• “In Republican Rome, starting with Sulla, the Senate struggled to keep the popular Roman generals in check. The Senate and other political entities were very concerned with the possibility of a powerful general, who might start considering himself superior to everyone else on earth, taking over the state and declaring himself king. It was in this context that the Romans came up with an idea, and the phrase 'memento mori' came into being to keep his ego in check. So while he marched in a chariot amidst a cheerful crowd, a slave sitting right behind him would whisper in his ear "memento mori" to remind him from time to time of his own mortality or prompt him to "look behind". All of that fame and honor was temporary, and death was inevitable even for those who are at the height of their power and career. This was recently recalled by Walter Isaacson toward the end of an interview: In ancient Rome there was a person who walked behind the general and said "memento mori, remember you're gonna die." We could probably use a bit more humility of this sort today as well. 
• Bret Devereaux described what he called the "Fremen Mirage", that “Hard times create strong men. Strong men create good times. Good times create weak men. And weak men create hard times”. He writes that "we are conditioned to think in terms of stories, and as a story, the Fremen Mirage, which turns all of history into a morality play wherein wealth and greed lead to defeat while austerity leads to victory – is a very attractive story." But it is wrong. And so it may be worth comparing with the story of hubris and humility laid out here. If those qualities replaced strength and weakness, the saying might be more valid. But unlike strong and weak men, who apparently both want good times, humble humans recognize the virtue in the hard times that created them, and so (conceptually at least) they wouldn't seek to artificially isolate good times to begin with. But accidents happen, and hubris can enter into the breach. 
• Here be megafauna. Paleoburrows with branching tunnels altogether tallying about 2,000 feet in length, originally more than six feet tall, three to five feet wide, with an estimated 4,000 metric tons of dirt and rock dug out of the hillside, and dug at least 8,000 to 10,000 years ago, when South America’s giant ground sloths and armadillos vanished. Heinrich Frank and his colleagues consider as possibilities several genera that once lived in South America and whose fossil remains suggest adaptation for serious digging: Catonyx, Glossotherium and the massive, several-ton Lestodon. Until the early 2000s hardly any burrows attributed to extinct megafauna had been described in the scientific literature. 
• In "Humans as a Hyperkeystone Species" Robert Paine points out that "clearly, the human hyperkeystone role is not new, but reaches back at least to the Pleistocene Overkill and resulting megafaunal collapse, which brought about novel vegetative states and altered fire regimes that profoundly changed landscape structure. What is new is the planetary nature of our hyperkeystone role in a globalized economy." According to him, we assumed the role of the former keystone species, placing ourselves as the dominant influence in trophic cascades and other ecological processes. With this great power comes great responsibility. Recall how, in her article "Humans Were Not Centre Stage," Barbara Ehrenreich suggests the importance of not forgetting our humble origins, which were not so long ago geologically speaking. (See also Ed Yong's article "In a Few Centuries, Cows Could Be the Largest Land Animals Left".)
• Sleep is a time of extreme vulnerability to predation. To reduce the risks of sleeping, the sentinel hypothesis (Frederick Snyder, 1966) proposes that group-living animals share the task of vigilance during sleep, with some individuals sleeping while others are awake. New research suggests variation in chronotypes, or sleep and wakefulness patterns, gave our ancestors an evolutionary advantage by helping them survive the dangerous hours of darkness. [Discover, Royal Society]
• The telescopefish (Gigantura) lives in the mesopelagic to bathypelagic zones of the ocean. It evolved highly modified eyes to detect the bioluminescent glow of prey items. Dante Fenolio wrote that "what is really cool is that the stomachs of these fishes are lined with a black, deeply pigmented tissue. This 'cloak' helps to hide bioluminescent organisms that the fishes have recently eaten. Nothing gives away a fish to potential predators like having something glowing in its stomach in the dark depths." After you eat an animal that had foolishly broadcasted its presence to everyone in the area, you immediately shut off the signal. Because there are always bigger fish in the sea (as the gooberfish pursuit sequence in Star Wars fancifully illustrated). Sure, Luke 11:33 reads "No man, when he hath lighted a candle, putteth it in a secret place, neither under a bushel, but on a candlestick, that they which come in may see the light." But if "they that come in" want to eat you, then under the bushel it goes! The Dark Forest doesn't operate by Biblical guidelines. (And the hypothesis has been applied to AI. Would Roko's Basilisk, for example, have reason to intentionally conceal its presence or capabilities?)

Monday, February 12, 2024

Map Makers: When systems and surfaces obtrude

John 18:38 at Sagrada Familia
I had several conversations with Robert Ellis, the most recent of which was prompted by a post to which Bayo Akomolafe responded. These allowed me to both understand some criticisms of McGilchrist (from Ellis), and to improve my own understanding of McGilchrist through them. I'll lay out a few of the interesting viewpoints we looked at together. And I'll try to use Jonathan Rowson's question to help frame the discussion: "What's at stake here?" using a few possible subheadings. The entire discussion is excerpted from a comment thread to a publicly accessible post.
 
This is a wide ranging discussion that began in July (sections two through four), everything following that (beginning with my post commenting on something Akomolafe said) occurred within the last several weeks.. So at places it circles back around and revisits the same topics a second or third time. I haven't had the time to properly edit all this for length, so I'm mostly sharing it unedited, with some of my more recent bracketed reflections. ...Some people will find this extremely pedantic and LH in orientation. I offer my apologies in advance. For those who might find something of interest here, read on.

TL;DR version: What did I learn? I guess the takeaway is that it is easier for some people to solve a difficult problem by pretending it isn't there (surface orientation), or otherwise suggest it cannot be addressed even if it is (system orientation), rather than try to relate to it according to the ways in which it becomes present to us (presentation orientation). And it is the "ways" of approaching these topics (the "how") that McGilchrist outlines, in other words, the phenomenology of the RH in its entirety (not selectively) that I've found very helpful. If we are not aware of this (Akomolafe seems enmeshed within the flat ontology of postmodernism), or if we accept some aspects but reject others (Ellis accepts some forms of meaning, but rejects paradox as this cannot be explained within his system), then the world of the RH may appear somewhat unintelligible. ...Indeed, when systems and surfaces obtrude, the "McGilchrist compass" will likely give a faulty reading, if any at all.
 
First topic: Meaning
 
One of the main criticisms Ellis has regarding McGilchrist's presentation centers around the distinction between two different kinds of meaning: 'embodied and associative meaning' (per Lakoff and Johnson) and 'representational meaning'. These two forms of meaning roughly correlate with the right and left hemispheres. The underlying meaning prior to our representations is the RH based 'embodied and associative meaning'. Our LH representations are at a more remote and abstracted level that is dependent on that meaning. In his review of TMWT Ellis writes:
 
"The ways in which meaning mediated by the right hemisphere can operate without dependence on representation in the left has been thoroughly charted by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, the pioneers of embodied meaning theory since the 1980’s. In brief, the meaning of our language (like that of all other symbols) is associative, dependent on the links made when we interact with objects or schemas in experience. We then develop this basic schematic language through metaphor so as to develop increasingly complex meaning-associations. McGilchrist makes reference to this work. As he writes, for instance: "There the motor, affective and cognitive elements are inextricable linked in ways that have human meaning, and do not need to be ‘combined’ or assembled mechanically by any higher process." Yet it is precisely this mechanical assemblage at a higher level that he remains engaged in for most of the rest of the book – somehow convinced that representations of how things really are are the key to understanding the world in a new and helpful way."
 
Ellis is very cautious not to attribute any truth value to representational assemblages, which for him can easily lead to the slippery slope of essentialist, Platonic, absolutizing, metaphysical claims of truth - the scourge of humanity that has led to "dogma, repression, and conflict". Which is why McGilchrist's apparent equivocation on the distinction between the two kinds of meaning is unacceptable to him. While discussing this with Ellis, though I can see his reasons for saying so, I suggested several possible explanations for this apparent equivocation. Briefly these involved the paradoxical transparency of metaphor that brings together surface and depth. In other words, I suggest that neither the bankruptcy of representational meaning nor the challenge of equivocation can be avoided with better linguistic tools, since it is an inescapable feature of that mode of thinking. Instead we need a shift in our mode of attention so we can "see through" representations and the 'groundlessness' that gives rise to their equivocation, and 'presence' to the world via that embodied and associative meaning.
 
Second topic: The "McGilchrist Compass"
 
Back in early July I tried to lay out how McGilchrist described what he considers to be one of his main contributions:
 
“When faced with two differing accounts of the world, we can tell from the characteristic ‘imprint’ of either hemisphere on each account which is more likely to be reliable. Without, of course, wishing to discount either of them altogether, we can make a shrewd assessment of which we ought to prefer. …If I am right, this is a genuine advance in philosophy.”
 
This is often repeated by him because it’s an important point. One might be tempted to say “Well you know one school of philosophy says this, another school of philosophy says that, take your pick”. This is the extreme relativism of postmodernism, favored for its absolute symmetry of bias. But in actual practice this symmetry produces ‘axiological nihilism’: the value of any choice is morally equivalent to any other choice we might make, and thus effectively meaningless. ...When the RH is captured by the LH we have difficulty understanding questions of value. If we have been captured by the LH, and thus are unable to recognize value asymmetry. 
 
McGilchrist claims he has something to add: “I can see the hallmark of the left hemisphere at work, and I can see the hallmark of the right hemisphere’s broader vision, and if we have to make decisions about which way we're going to lean, then I think it's wise to lean towards the one that tends to be more veridical.” His contribution, in other words, is to enable us to see axiological asymmetry.
 
This moves us from either/or ‘exclusive symmetry’ to a sort of both/and ‘inclusive asymmetry’ in how we relate to these choices for action. From the viewpoint of the LH one would tend to view alternatives as an ‘either/or’ completely relative choice, and exclude the lesser choice after having made a selection (absolutist). However from the viewpoint of the RH, we “make a shrewd assessment of which we ought to prefer” without “wishing to discount either of them altogether” (thus neither absolutist nor relativist, but provisional or paradoxical). The asymmetric "both both/and and either/or" approach thus recapitulates the hemispheric asymmetry (further elaborated in the subsection of TMWT titled "The asymmetry of the coincidentia oppositorum".) This anchors McGilchrist's speculations concerning veridical paths. 
 
"There's usually something to be said on both sides of the argument, which the right hemisphere is much better able to see. A lot of what it has to say could seem contradictory. You need to hold two points of view. Each of them has something to be said for it, but they aren't strictly speaking to be fused into one. That is a more difficult task to do" McGilchrist points out. The RH is capable of recognizing a more nuanced and complex prioritization of tasks according to asymmetric qualities, and this impels us not to exclude the lesser choice, but rather to prioritize one over the other. [I describe this methodology again below.] This broader understanding is much more sensitive to the actual limitations of embodied context, and thus can help to shift the individual and society from a misaligned and diseased state to one more consistent with the qualities of flourishing.
 
Third topic: Metaphysics
 
McGilchrist tells us that whereas TMHE was about how “the two halves of the brain pay different kinds of attention and the way in which this has played out in the history of Western Europe, TMWT is about the most basic questions: Who are we? What is the world? and What is our relationship with the cosmos?” Attempting to answer these more metaphysical questions is a job widely viewed with deep suspicion, but it directly follows from what McGilchrist believes to be his main contribution. Not only is he providing a methodology for making judgements and decisions, but he actually thinks that, from the perspective of a brain whose hemispheres are in ‘right relation’ to one another, we can say something meaningful about the world in which we live, even though such efforts may only produce what appear to be paradoxes where opposites "give rise to and fulfil one another". This is important, because we need to be able to perceive the asymmetries within the world (esp. in terms of values). 

Robert Ellis, however, wants to suggest that we cannot make any metaphysical claims. Ellis comments: "In his conversation with Rupert Read McGilchrist stated "I have never said that the right hemisphere has access to ultimate truths. What I'm suggesting is that it's more likely to reach them than the left hemisphere." I think there's a basic philosophical error there in trying to apply probability to ultimates. As Popper pointed out, any division of infinity is still infinity. Ultimate claims have infinite scope and still remain ultimate when you try to probabilize them, unless you equivocate and temporarily forget they are ultimate. There can be no probability of either hemisphere 'knowing the truth'. There is just uncertainty, and ways in which the right hemisphere helps us adapt to it that we have neglected. [...] understanding the value of each hemisphere in terms of the projected 'truth', and working backwards from there, [is] an approach that privileges the absolute left hemisphere perspective as the starting point. There is another approach which better fits the working of the right hemisphere in my view: you start with the basic awareness of uncertainty to avoid any absolute claims, and then weigh up the best available incrementally justified possible beliefs for practical judgement. That's how I'd describe the practice of provisionality as an element of the Middle Way. It's an approach that starts with a recognition of the imperfect, and stays in it, rather than just paying lip service to uncertainty but nevertheless still making deductions down from our absolute ideas of 'the truth'." 

Ellis seems to be applying Zeno's paradox to metaphysics. This may be related to his apparent difficulty in consistently applying the concept of the 'unity of surface and depth' (more on this below). Furthermore, if we have access to 'embodied and associative' meaning, as he earlier stated, and this in turn is in some sense 'ontologically primitive', and if that is the meaning to which McGilchrist encourages us to presence through our RH, then this is the sort of 'truth' that we are more likely to access via the RH. In other words, McGilchrist is just restating what I've called here the 'McGilchrist compass' (the idea I earlier referred to as a "key"). It is entirely possible to rephrase 'more likely to reach ultimate truth' as 'best available with reference to embodied meaning' since embodied meaning is ontologically primitive truth. We cannot differentiate absolutely between truth and falsehood via representational meaning, but via embodied meaning we can presence to which paths are more veridical. Had McGilchrist said "more veridical" in his response to Rupert Read above, Ellis' would have had no dispute with him here. 

Fourth topic: Transparency
 
McGilchrist describes how radical the phenomenological asymmetry between the hemispheres is:
 
"Most of us live in a world that is semi-transparent, or, as one might say, ‘translucent’, in the sense that the eye rests temporarily on the surface, but does not stay there, instead passing through and beyond to something deeper and broader beneath, the nexus in which it is embedded, which gives it meaning. But in schizophrenia, the plane of focus has changed: the gaze stops short, the surface obtrudes and becomes opaque."
 
Crucially, to those for whom the world is translucent, opacity is understood as well. "We see it all right, and yet through it to something beyond." But for those to whom it is only opaque, transparency is much harder to understand. The practical effect of the hemisphere hypothesis is to enable us to recognize if we have been captured by the left hemisphere, if the world appears 'opaque'. And from this recognition to begin to understand transparency. Attention "is a profoundly moral act" we are told, and so we have a moral obligation to understand this difference, and to understand the implications for how we prioritize actions when we have more than one option.
 
We are not limited to prioritizing a merely instrumental ‘choice optionality’ and maximizing power or pleasure over the short term, while procrastinating on doing what that 'still small voice' says is ‘the right thing to do’. There is the possibility to invert this, if this is indeed the sort of position we find ourselves. We can recognize a broader understanding of virtue. So it’s not just a simple inversion, it’s an inclusive asymmetry, one that reflects the embodied paradox of living in a translucent world."
 
Intermission: Bayo Akomolafe, Postmodernism, and Value
 
"The best lack all conviction, while the worst, Are filled with passionate intensity."  - Yeats, W.B.: 'The Second Coming'
 
In the comment section of one of his posts Bayo Akomolafe wrote: "Perhaps the most importunate instance of the stickiness of human-centred thought is the presumption that... morality has a stable goal; that justice is culture-free and universally intuited... [because] there are no Archimedean points... by which we might situate what's 'better than', except within immanent relations and sociomaterial practices that condition bodies in their co-becoming." 
 
This is a very seductive viewpoint, but it may reflect a tendency to take the relativism of postmodernism too far. And I think that may in part be because it channels the reactive psychology of victimhood. We are all the victims of something. We all know what it has been like to have been told we were wrong by some person or some system that has unjustly abused its authority and power. So we all recognize the truth in this perspective. But this can easily lead us astray. Nietzsche, the father of postmodernism, would probably agree with Akomolafe's statement. He would say that value is entirely subjective. My values are no better or no worse than yours. So don't judge. Who's going to decide? Your 'wrong' is my 'right' and there is no one who can say otherwise. But I'd ask: Where has this gotten us today? 
 
The qualification that our value judgments are always contextualized by culture, and that none of us has access to an 'Archimedean point' (or 'God's eye view') does not excuse us from our responsibility to recognize and respond to value and make ethical judgments. It is a dereliction of responsibility to suggest that it does. The fact is that, in spite of all of our differences, we recognize more values in common, even cross culturally, than we do not. That is the real mystery. (Whether we act on them is another story.) And it has been our failure to engage in a larger, more substantive discussion concerning value that is currently undermining our efforts across almost every domain in which we seek change. 
 
Now all that said, this may be an unfair representation of what Akomolafe actually believes. I think that in this instance he's just repeating a common, and most unfortunate, tenet of postmodern thought. But so long as the ethical relativism of the postmodern worldview holds sway among us, the 'value revolution' that Merz et al hope for will be stillborn. 
 
But it's not only for that reason we should reject postmodern relativism. Having thrown out the baby with the bathwater, our contemporary postmodern culture is no less blind to value than the colonial cultures it critiques. And perhaps more significantly, because of this it has made itself vulnerable to repeated victimization by them. Can you see the cycle here? 
 
[The postmodern response is generally that no theory of transcendent value is needed, merely a pragmatic theory that can solve the "interpersonal utility comparison problem". So we can accept Elinor Ostrom or Donella Meadows perhaps, but only some parts of Zak Stein or Daniel Schmachtenberger, because the latter two have described value as transcendent in some sense. The postmodern only needs a better understanding of those "immanent relations and sociomaterial practices", which is perhaps one reason why there is nothing in postmodernism and posthumanism (or Akomolafe's 'postactivism') that would preclude techno-optimism and TESCREALism, or anything else for that matter.]
 
Akomolafe read my post and responded: "In my new book-to-come, presently being written, I note that moral relativism is an unexpected, quite surprising reiteration of moral absolutism. Briefly, this is so because it seems to retain (by negation) the Archimedean point so intrinsic to modern/Kantian formulations of responsibility and morality. Absolutism universalizes specific moral codes; relativism makes them fully particular. However, both begin from moral codes. You may have misread a process-oriented view (which sees morality as immanent material-discursive relations, not transcendent codes) as postmodern relativism - when my articulation tries to problematize their shared transcendentalism, while seeing morality as this utterly creative thing that exceeds perceptions of right and wrong.
 
I think of morality as the codificatory potential of bodies in coalition. That is, morality has no inherent predetermined meaning or goal. It is what comes to matter within an assemblage of relations - a measuring in and a measuring out. This is what I mean by the utter, violent creativity of morality - in keeping with a process-oriented view. I think of ethics as the entropy of morality. If one thinks of morality as a coping mechanism, a minor gesture, ethics is the virtuality that taunts the seeming stability of the moral."

[For Akomolafe ethics and moral codes align with 'representational meaning' (socially constructed, as Foucault would say), Morality might align with 'embodied and associative meaning', however he prefers to eliminate inherent meaning from this and is thus left with the 'violent creativity' of an immanent, flat ontology that has no deeper meaning. This contrasts with the importance of meaning, value, and purpose for McGilchrist, which are all consequences of the ability to perceive depth. McGilchrist wrote "One driving force behind the emphasis on surfaces has, since Nietzsche, been an affirmation of phenomenal experience, as against the view that phenomena merely obscure an ideal Kantian ‘reality’ hidden behind them."]

I responded: "I think what might be artificially constraining this discussion is the context of a rather flat ontology, in which I assume (perhaps wrongly) that you are working through these ideas. I would suggest that as long as that is the premise with which you begin, values will remain somewhat epiphenomenal. Maybe intentionally so. But there might be more to the story if we explore alternative ontologies. Can we permit that which is considered to be transcendent (i.e. meaning, value, and purpose) without thereby derogating the immanent? It seems impossible, but writers like McGilchrist suggest such a paradox:
 
“…we do not come to understand or experience the infinite, or, for that matter, the eternal, by attempting somehow to transcend the finite or the temporal, but by immersing ourselves in them, in such a way as to pass into the infinite, manifest there where they are. The path to the infinite and eternal lies in, not away from – not even to one side of – the finite and the temporal.” (TMWT)
 
“Body and soul, metaphor and sense, myth and reality, the work of art and its meaning – in fact the whole phenomenological world, is just what it is and no more, not one thing hiding another; and yet the hard thing is the seemingly easy business, just ‘seeing what it is’. The reality is not behind the work of art: to believe so would be, as Goethe put it in an image I referred to earlier, like children going round the back of the mirror. We see it in – through – the mirror. Similarly, he says, we experience the universal in, or through, the particular, the timeless in, or through, the temporal.” (TMHE)
 
To be sure, this might not be the way most people think of an ontology where there is “no discernible line between surface and depth”, but it suggests to me that value is deeply misunderstood today. It may turn out to be the water in which we swim. If that is so, then we cannot do anything other than respond to value and make ethical judgments. I mean "we" in the broadest possible sense, inclusive of the other-than-human world."
 
Akomolafe replied: "I had a lively personal conversation with Iain about this when we met in Bristol - in front of a live audience. The tensions between our ideas animated the room - without descending into an untoward divergence. We were exploring consciousness and value. Where I think of value as immanent - and that the transcendent might be configured as an "outside-within" - Iain seems hesitant to think through these Deleuzian tensions. At the moment, I have received exciting news and I feel suddenly hungry. But I would love to continue this conversation where possible, brother. I accidentally happened upon it, and immediately loved the texture of your disagreement. I love beautiful disagreement and sensuous agreements. I love when disagreement is humble. I just couldn't stop myself from replying - though I rarely do. We travel together, brother. Talk soon."
 
Third commenter added: "Bayo does, however, characterize his points in enigmas in order to not ruffle peoples feathers. He's very good at actually speaking deep truths, while disguising them as not being offensive to the people he intends them for. This is common amongst most speakers who get along with everybody, and have to speak in riddles in order to plant seeds in those consciousnesses impervious to novel thought. I see it as a dialectic and discursive tool."
 
I responded: "I think he speaks deep truths, but in our contemporary postmodern culture I would suggest that this sort of message simply feeds into the prevailing zeitgeist. I believe it offers the illusion of change [with the freedom of 'violent creativity'] while being incapable of producing change [due to a flat ontology without any reference to depth]. It's not the first time we've seen this by any means. So unless we first recover that "feel for the whole" that we've lost, and recognize the contours of our upside world, 'thrashing about' will only tighten the snare we are caught in.
 
To clarify, it's mostly when he tries to incorporate the postmodern/ posthuman legacy that his messaging begins to suffer and ends up at cross-purposes. Now I do think there is a way to do that. Postermodernism is not all wrong. But I don't think he's figured that out yet. Because I get the impression he likes the style without really understanding the substance (not uncommon in this area). Among the deep truths of postmodern/ posthumanism there are a lot of "empty calories", and for those who can't tell the difference, guess which parts they will preferentially consume? It ends up undoing and blunting the effect of the sections, like below, where (I think) he is at his best. 
 
On the recent fighting:
"...this conflict has never been an issue between Palestinians and Israeli... a simple humanistic analysis (and ‘solution’) that focuses squarely on bad actors and their usurpation of territory risks oversimplifying... all the ways we are held within vast assemblages and machines that produce us. All the ways we only show up in part and not in wholes." https://www.bayoakomolafe.net/post/the-lines-that-whisper-us-rethinking-agency-and-accountability-in-the-middle-east-through-the-more-than-human
 
And from a recent conversation:
“Consider the American Constitution declaring “the pursuit of happiness” as a principle. I wish it also made space for “the pursuit of grief”. But no, it's just the pursuit of happiness. The problem is, when you push out the entanglements of grief and hopelessness, you demonize one side and fetishize the other. You end up with ‘fetishized joy’ materializing as absolute consumerism, extractivism, and white colonialism. You end up with dispossession, suffering, and pain. But if we give back space for grief, we can then taste the textures of joy.”
 
On Mandala, Bayo wrote:
"Mandela was a memory of a future we once lived and flourished in. His legacy transcends the dialectics of black politics or white dominance; he was something a lot deeper than our denominational intuitions allow. He taught us that forgiveness is not so much about how much we are willing to let the other go free, it is about how much we recognize ourselves in the other. It is about changing our language to allow for new gestalts to emerge..."
 
This is profound and beautiful. ...Anyway, just my opinions.
 
Robert Ellis commented on the Akomolafe thread: "The Middle Way here needs a more thorough reframe than the 'subjective' v 'objective' argument about ethics suggests. I agree with what you quote Akomolafe saying at the top about there being no Archimedean point, but I disagree with your assumption that this implies relativism. If we understand relativism in practical terms, the damaging aspect of it is the assumption that no given judgement is better than another, which undermines the value of practical moral discernment. However, the value of some moral judgements over others does not have to rest on a God's eye view or be defeated by its absence. Rather, moral normativity is justified by the quality of the judgement applied, and of the awareness of options that it incorporates in its consideration. That awareness (the basis of provisionality) in turn depends generally on our degree of psychological integration. The importance of the right hemisphere is not, as McGilchrist mistakenly thinks, to give us an alternative hotline to the absolute morality we have lost, but to help us improve our moral judgement by more adequate connection with the left, which opens up more options at the point of judgement."
 
[Yes, "the value of some moral judgements over others does not have to rest on a God's eye view or be defeated by its absence". However what does he mean suggesting that for McGilchrist it rests on "an alternative hotline to the absolute morality". Is this the "embodied and associative" meaning he referenced in his review of TMWT? The next question might be what does "embodied meaning" or "immanent relations" (Akomolafe) refer to? This gets us into the ontological or metaphysical talk about which we can only speak figuratively. Figurative language, by incorporating the depth of transparency, avoids the absolute literalism of representational meaning. More on that below.]

Fifth topic: Paradox
 
I responded: "I'm glad to see everyone here distancing themselves from postmodern relativism. It really is a caricature. But because it is tacitly accepted by many, one cannot avoid bringing it up. Once we move past this the issue becomes more complex. For McGilchrist: "The polarity between the 'objective' and 'subjective' points of view is a creation of the left hemisphere's analytic disposition." (TMHE) What does this mean? If we cannot talk about values as being (in mutually exclusive categories of) either objectively absolute or subjectively relative, then absolute Archimedean points may be a misleading "category error" so to speak, with no bearing.
 
Are we resigned to apophatic descriptions and double negatives? It is "not this" and it is not "not this". That is a frustrating thought for anyone attempting to conceptually and linguistically nail it down. So, finding that task impossible, the eliminativist might respond by trying a different categorical distinction: the immanent and the transcendent. At which point they will then usually place what is not amenable to description in the latter category for eventual elimination (there is no inherent meaning), and/or redefine it using the more tractable terms of the first (it's really a different meaning). It is in this way that the "map" has come to replace the "terrain" according to McGilchrist and others. ...All that said, it cannot be argued that these aren't beautiful maps. Some are very elaborate.
 
The tensions between subjective/ objective, relative/ absolute, immanent/ transcendent, map/ terrain, left/ right, and so on, are mutually entailed. And for McGilchrist, these are alive to us via the analytic left hemisphere. To be sure, a predisposition for conceptual division, fragmentation, and analysis is a very useful thing, but it can enter into a positive feedback loop that may lead to denial and neglect - the eliminativist perspective, a process whose first casualty is the transcendent - if it is not counterbalanced by a right hemisphere that is able to hold the tensions together and "stay with the trouble". So there is a kind of asymmetry to this relationship. Unfortunately for us, both paradox and asymmetry are for the most part incoherent to contemporary thought. We are instead biased toward consistency and symmetry. This impoverishes the values discussion immensely, and often prevents it from even starting."

[Not only would no absolute Archimedean points be possible, but no absolute relativity as well. Whereas this union may lead a postmodern to a flat ontology, for McGilchrist the paradox of division within union prevents the ontology from collapsing and becoming flat! Paradox is a key feature.]

Robert Ellis: "I don't think it's the elaboration of the map that gives it its value, but how well it helps us find our way through the terrain. For example (to continue the metaphor), some maps are on too large a scale and others on too small a scale, whilst others mark things symbolically that are not of practical interest, whilst omitting the things that are practically important. All we can do is continue to work on improving the practicality of the map."
 
I responded: "While we should improve the practicality of the maps, we must also attend to the terrain that is being mapped. There's many ways to say this of course. For example, when Daniel Schmachtenberger describes the importance of "wisdom binding intelligence" he's referring to the primacy of the terrain over any of the maps that we make. It is the terrain that should guide our maps, models, and "manipulation of parts, i.e. technology," and not the other way around." 
 
Robert Ellis: "Ah, well there I disagree. Not being God, I don't think we can have any access to the terrain-in-itself, so it can hardly have 'primacy'. All the 'reality' talk can be easily substituted by awareness of and adjustment for our biases, which are features of experience and don't require metaphysics. Recognition of uncertainty comes first."
 
[This is revealing some equivocation about what we are referring to when we use terms like 'access' to the terrain, or 'presencing' to the world. It gets back to the two types of meaning. Ellis had earlier noted that we have access to embodied and associative meaning, but not representational meaning, so he's forcing a conflict here by assuming that Schmachtenberger (and by implication McGilchrist) is not referring to this form of meaning. That isn't the case. This forced conflict leads to more problems later, as you'll see below. Unfortunately I didn't make this point at the time. ...If we do confuse our representational biases for reality, it can lead to conflict and repression. I think 'inclusive asymmetry', the paradoxical union of division and union, can prevent this sort of false confidence that can take us to exclusive 'true or false' dichotomized absolutization and help to 'calibrate the moral compass' as we engage in the 'dance of the hemispheres' (aka McGilchrist manoeuvre).]
 
I responded: “That sounds like a very pragmatic and parsimonious explanation, and there was a time when I would’ve agreed. But I now prefer the paradoxical explanation, which I’ve found to be far richer, and critically, more revealing. “Everything should be made as simple as possible, but no simpler.” A paradox holds tension, and it is tension that must be explained. In this case, the tension is between a familiar map, and an unknowable terrain which is fundamentally not amenable to description. Feng Youlan wrote “One needs thought in order to be conscious of the unthinkable, just as sometimes one needs sound in order to be conscious of silence. One must think about the unthinkable, yet as soon as one tries to do so, it immediately slips away.” We cannot dismiss it on account of such difficulties. But then again, many do.”
 
[McGilchrist uses many examples of paradox in his book and his conversations that might've been helpful to have brought up. The apple pie metaphor: You need tart apples and sweet honey to make an apple pie. Likewise, we need both RH and LH, or associative and representational meaning. Matt Segall recently pointed out that Whitehead's two elementary categories are "actual occasions" and "eternal objects" which presuppose one another. He wrote: "the polarity between them is what throws the world into process". The question is, in Schmachtenberger's terms, how does wisdom "bind" intelligence? Ellis suggests reducing equivocation is important to this end. I suggest depth perception allows us to see through inherently equivicatory representations altogether.
 
(Earlier I had remarked to Ellis: "Paradox and opponent processing appears to be a fundamental feature of our world. I was completely confused why anyone would find any comfort in paradox at all, as at first it only vexed me. Considerably so. Only more recently has that changed. But that was by no means a foregone conclusion and of course for many people it never does cease to be vexing."
Ellis responded : "I would say I've taken the opposite journey, from being intrigued by paradox in earlier life to feeling that it's unhelpful now. That change has followed a growing recognition of the need to always prioritize practical judgement, which for me had its roots in Buddhist practice.")]
 
Robert Ellis: “It's not a question of dismissal for me, nor does parsimony appeal to me much. It's rather a matter of distinguishing the helpful meaning of metaphysical speculations (which is often archetypal) from their damaging dogmatic application as belief. Much more a matter of winnowing. Part of that winnowing process is recognizing that there are some things that we don't need to explain to find helpful ways forward. Our ideas about them may be inspirational, but they are ideas, not bases of belief.”
 
["Winnowing" is a metaphor that Ellis used in his review of TMWT as well. His extremely pragmatic focus is the logic behind his approach to the "Middle Way" philosophy he developed. Winnowing implies that which is winnowed, and anything he associates with absolutizations (aka metaphysical talk) has become the primary target of that action. So his criticisms of McGilchrist in this regard are not personal, they are simply the consequence of his philosophical system. However, I think this system and it's eagerness to winnow is also inherently antagonistic to the paradoxical "both/and" asymmetric inclusivity of McGilchrist, through which we can view any topic without the need to "winnow" it away. It is possible to appreciate the terminological clarity that motivates Ellis, while also suggesting that he's "missing the depth of the forest for the trees". An important contrast might be made: to the extent that the motivating logic for Ellis is perceptual accuracy concerning representational thought and thus the elimination of metaphysical talk as incommensurate with that, then the motivation for McGilchrist is perceptual accuracy via inherently figurative 'presentational thought' and thus the reincorporation of metaphysical awareness as intrinsic to that, to put it roughly.]
 
I responded: “Suppose someone uses the language of meaning, value, and purpose. As you pointed out, we do need to distinguish between the helpful and harmful application of these ideas. When such descriptions are literal and dogmatic they can be very harmful. We definitely don’t want that. But if they are figurative or archetypal, then they might point to something helpful. Which brings up McGilchrist’s use of the notion of translucency or transparency. Unlike opacity, translucency is able to integrate surface with depth [or representamen and object, in Peircean terms, or perhaps we might say, the caricatures of Nietzsche and Kant]. Any approach that makes no allowance for depth is missing something. McGilchrist restated a very old insight when he wrote: 
 
“...opposites not only co-exist, but give rise to and fulfil one another (‘sunt complementa’), and are conjoined (like the poles of a magnet) without any intervening boundary, while nonetheless remaining distinct as opposites. And indeed the more intimately they are united, the more, not the less, they are differentiated." 
 
If we fail to perceive that paradoxical union between surface and depth, then we become vulnerable to the dogmatic application of metaphysics and axiology. Or in other words, despite our best efforts, it's hard to escape cycles of victimization when we don't understand the form of thinking associated with exploitation. How we attend is "the difference that makes the difference”. And so to avoid dogmatism, rather than just seeking out some midpoint on a flat ontology, it may be at least as important to shift our attention so we can see into that extra dimension of depth, and begin to learn how to talk about that.”
 
[Like Zak Stein and McGilchrist, I suspect that axiological considerations like value, etc are "ontological primitives" that we can recognize if we perceive "depth" (most people perceive depth in meaning, time, and telic depth, without any prompting). But contemporary culture is for the most part either blind or, more likely, negligent in this regard, and engaged in a reinforcing feedback cycle that increases our negligence. Which suggests we have quite a bit of room for improvement.]
 
Robert Ellis: "In the quote you've given above, I just see Iain taking metaphorical constructions over-literally. The 'opposites' are features of our way of categorizing the world, not of the world itself, and thus they cannot be 'conjoined' in themselves (that's metaphysical talk). The insight he may be trying to get at is a psychological one - that apparently opposing positions are addressing different conditions, so we can learn more about conditions by reframing and integrating what they seem to be telling us. But that's an entirely practical point that needs to be approached practically, not an excuse for more metaphysics.
 
We experience 'opposites' in various senses in such things as oil and water not mixing, or magnets repelling each other, but conflicting opposites are entirely human projections that reflect what does or does not fit our purposes. The thinking 'associated with exploitation' is metaphysics - i.e. beliefs that cannot be modified in the light of experience, and that thus form easy shortcuts to bind groups quickly. So the 'difference that makes a difference' is whether we can in practice find a point between opposing absolutes that addresses conditions better - nothing to do with 'some midpoint on a flat ontology', as there's no ontology involved.
 
'Surface' and 'depth' are also metaphors that are developed from the experience of feelings or intuitions being deep in our bodies or not, and 'translucency' from an experience of seeing: it is not helpful to literalize and rigidify these metaphors by turning them into metaphysics, but we can readily appreciate their relationship to embodied experience, and use that to help us gain an appreciative but critical perspective on constructions using them."

[Ellis is restating his initial point here, that he finds paradox unhelpful. The notion of surface, depth, and translucency is intimately connected to how we see through representations to the deeper presentation. We need the harmony between surface and depth, which is another way of saying we need harmony between LH and RH, between the emissary and the master (syzygy). ...In early July Ellis had remarked "The stuff about opacity is also well put". But alas, at this point in the conversation he seems to be pursuing a path away from consilience, and so now "it is not helpful to literalize and rigidify these metaphors", assuming that were the intent to begin with.]
 
Sixth Topic: Metaphor, interpretation, exegesis
 
I responded: "It may be that some of this can be chalked up to terminological differences, in that it concerns how we use these terms. Or rather, it may be attributed to an attentional difference concerning how we see the purported phenomena to which they refer. The implication of McGilchrist's thesis is that, assuming it is possible to describe at least two very different views upon any subject, then as important as 'what' we see is 'how' we see it. Applying that here, it may be possible to see metaphysics as, on the one hand, abstract and literal representations, or on the other hand, as inherently metaphorical language. In other words, perhaps it is only the abstract and literal definition which you associate with metaphysics, whereas McGilchrist may be suggesting a definition which is capable of accommodating more than one perspective. 
 
In connection, it may be worth noting that if we "literalize and rigidify metaphors" we have not changed 'what' we see, rather we have only changed 'how' we see it, insofar as a descriptive approach reflects an attentional stance. That could make a big difference. So we may come nearest to an understanding of value (or anything else) by using the metaphorical or 'gestural' approach. This may be a ‘repugnant conclusion’ for the more literal-minded among us. It might be justifiably objected that definitions neither should change, nor do change, regardless of attention. And it may be objected that the phenomena in question is illusory, or at least inaccessible. Nonetheless, our ability to see phenomena is affected by our quality of attention. In other words, how we attend has global implications, which may extend all the way to the meaning of terms, how they are used, and the way in which they are described."
 
[The importance of metaphor and analogical thinking has been remarked upon by many, both in its foundational and inescapable aspects. Metaphor may not seem to bear any relevance to metaphysics, or meaning, value, and purpose. It might seem incoherent, illogical, and of course unnecessary. But the etymology of words reveals their origin in metaphor and analogy for embodied and associative meanings. (Star Trek fans will recall the episode "Darmok".) The suggestion that analogy is crucially important is not unique of course; Robert Rosen, author of Life Itself, and Douglas Hofstadter, author of Surfaces and Essences (from which this post title is partly inspired) also agreed. What McGilchrist is describing eludes exhaustive description, and that presents a difficulty. We certainly could read his statements as rigid and literal metaphysics. However, given the context of his thesis, and that they are coming from a psychiatrist and literary scholar, the safer explanation might be that they should be read metaphorically. 
 
The context of McGilchrist's work is of course a comparative exercise wherein one form of attention is contrasted with another to bring to light the asymmetry between them in regard to our experience of the world. And by means of recognizing this asymmetry it is supposed that those "helpful ways forward" stand forth a bit clearer. If we are overly explicit we often obscure an implied meaning, but if we use analogy and metaphor we can risk misunderstanding, for numerous reasons. Is there some optimal balance or combination of the explicit and implicit? What is the most helpful way forward for any given author or audience? Metaphysical misunderstandings and confusion may not be something we can entirely prevent, on the part of either an author or their audience. But that also lays the groundwork for what can become a productive dialogue.]
 
Robert Ellis: "The idea of multiple perspectives on metaphysics takes us to the equivocation problem. Ambiguity isn't a problem when it just helps us appreciate complexity and soften up our rigidity, but when used in any kind of practical argument it really is. If we use terms that are most commonly used absolutely in relative senses, that provides a ready field for confusion and rationalisation, ad hoc arguments, motte and bailey fallacies, and so on. McGilchrist illustrates this by falling into these when he assumes, for instance that Platonic style metaphysics is necessary for a sense of life-meaning. He justifies metaphysics using relative arguments and then uses it to justify absolute claims. Terminology is highly adaptable, but we need a coherent practical strategy underlying how we choose to use it, which takes account both of its current use and how we wish it to be used.
 
I agree entirely about the need to emphasise how we pay attention to things: but that also applies to the way we think and the way we use concepts. Absolutized thinking such as metaphysics is distinctive in the ways that it forces our attention into a dichotomy of either accepting or rejecting a given representational claim. One of the major problems with trying to use such terminology in non-absolute ways is that it's impossible to change that basic dichotomization in the way we use it: a given claim is either true or not, and to say it's 'half-true' is another way of saying it's not true, or not the way things 'actually are' beyond our experience. Using it in relative ways is like trying to use a hammer to screw in a screw, once one widens one's attention to the wider issues of the practical uses of terms."
 
I responded: "If the equivocation is in regard to the definition of the terms that are used to represent phenomena, then greater specificity will be our friend. But if it is due to an attentional or perspectival difference concerning how we see the purported phenomena, as is the case here, then additional detail might not help. More to the point, greater specificity could actually engage and reinforce the very perspective that opposes the one from which we would've been able to come nearer to the phenomena, thereby only obscuring the implied meaning. Likewise, the "basic dichotomization" in the way we use terminology is, per McGilchrist, "a creation of the left hemisphere's analytic disposition". So if we insist upon adherence to these modes of thinking from the outset, we may actually prevent the possibility of recognizing phenomena that might have otherwise been revealed had we taken the less appealing approach of metaphor. We also know that the desire for explicit language is correlated to a tendency to deny that which cannot be contained by it. Which leads us to the ironic conclusion that some of the steps we take to minimize misunderstanding may operate at cross-purposes to genuine understanding. So while analogy and metaphor may lack clarity and risk misunderstanding, there are inherent risks to both approaches. 
 
I don't know if there can ever be a "coherent practical strategy" for how to induce a leap of perspective from a literal to a more figurative mode of thought, or allow us to recognize when one has occurred. The explicit and quantitative are ill suited to account for the implicit and qualitative. Where one person may infer absolute metaphysical claims of necessity that are themselves either true or not true, and which expose numerous logical fallacies, another may see analogical thinking and implied metaphor that is not intended to state 'the way things actually are', but rather to 'gesture toward' them. Sometimes analogies announce themselves, like your hammer and screw analogy, which is itself an excellent example of the capacity to convey deeper meaning, but the majority of metaphors do not betray their form without access to a broader contextual understanding, without access to that nebulous 'feel for the whole' which we are incapable of incepting into another person. 
 
We are often faced with a choice between at least two different ways to read or understand anything. If there are any reasons to doubt which we should prefer it would probably be best to consider both. Then we won't miss the opportunity to critically appraise the use of metaphor qua metaphor. Which is especially important given the asymmetry here. If we mistake the literal for the figurative we have not lost as much as if we mistake the figurative for the literal. Because whereas the former risks imputing an aspect of depth or additional meaning not otherwise intended, the latter risks falling short of and missing the target altogether."
 
[McGilchrist: "The problem is that the very brain mechanisms which succeed in simplifying the world so as to subject it to our control militate against a true understanding of it." A very significant paradox. Recall the phrase 'Less is more.' Ellis' winnowing is intended to remove the possibility of metaphor; this isn't the sort of 'less is more' that is helpful. However metaphor, by being less specific allows the mind to see what cannot be captured. This is the kind of 'less is more' that is helpful. And it is in that sense that the paradoxical sentiment applies here. Ellis' reviews of TMHE and TMWT both reflect his willingness to gladly follow McGilchrist insofar as he writes unambiguously. However in TMWT McGilchrist switches his approach and begins to indulge the use of figurative language to a much greater extent, which is common to his literary background and speculative philosophy inclinations. For reasons described here, this allows him to better pursue the elusive subject of metaphysics. Ellis either ignores or fails to notice this change, and he continues to preferentially interpret and evaluate McGilchrist literally and, by all appearances, devastatingly. But due to his misapprehension of metaphor, I think this is a significant mistake. Ellis' review ends up becoming a sustained attack on a strawman that for the most part only serves to confirm his own biases, and this may be because he is either unwilling (or unable) to accept McGilchrist's work in the spirit in which it is presented. It is as oddly triumphal in its denunciation as it is blind. The set of concepts he struggles to understand, or avoids mention of, include paradox, translucency, and perhaps most significantly, metaphor, all of which defy a simple account by the LH mode of thinking. (A video clip of Bruce Lee in "Enter the Dragon" explaining the “Finger pointing to the moon” comes to mind.)]
 
Robert Ellis: "I have no problem at all with the figurative appealing to the RH to give us a feel for a situation. The issue is the metaphysical interpretation of metaphor that appropriates it and turns it into rigid LH representational belief. We can't miraculously make a LH representation into a RH one to create a 'leap of perspective': when we think we're doing that, we're still in the LH perspective and are digging it in more deeply. The LH and RH have different functions that we need to accept: the LH helps us to solve problems in practical terms, but it deceives us when it thinks it's telling us how the world ultimately is instead, and the RH provides new meaning resources and alerts us to new information that the LH can then investigate. To try to use the RH for an entirely LH function - verbal description of how things are for a specific purpose - is self-deception. The vagueness of the RH is good and important, as long as we recognize it as providing meaning, not 'truth'."
 
I responded: "Right, each has its respective role, and though they are united they must be kept divided; these are necessarily separate modes of attention. And I agree that what is associated with figurative thinking can be misappropriated and attended to in the manner of literal thinking, and that in general this should not be done. The converse of this is the possibility that what is associated with literal thinking can be attended to and taken up by figurative thinking. However you seem to suggest this may not be possible: "We can't miraculously make a [literal] LH representation into a [figurative] RH one to create a 'leap of perspective'".  Now, I would understand the desire to obviate this possibility, given your assumptions, which seem to include (1) the inability of the RH to 'presence to' the terrain or anything like value, meaning, and purpose, and (2) the perception that the only possible way of thinking about them is literal, by definition. Under these starting assumptions the RH cannot access nor offer anything at all. The conclusion is: 'We can't, and furthermore we wouldn't want to if we could.' But of course I would question these assumptions by suggesting that there may be a misunderstanding concerning what that "miraculous" leap of perspective consists in. We might reconsider the capacity of the RH to reveal the world to us, and also its unifying and integrating capacity. (Jonathan Rowson partially described this as the "McGilchrist Manoeuvre".) 
 
I'll set that aside for the moment and return to the transition of the figurative to literal, about which we do agree. Here we see a draining away of meaning as 'style' becomes elevated above 'substance'. And we are left with hollow representations, like an empty container that can be easily, and all too often, appropriated by predatory opportunists for ill purposes. The danger of dogma is not just literal thinking. Rather than imputing meaning that isn't there, it coincides with a diminution of the capacity to see meaning behind representations. And so the relative importance of signifier and signified is inverted. This is analogous to the case studies of RH damage, which display a profound loss and impoverishment of the quality of experience. So yes, we might say that "meaning resources" provided by the RH most definitely do help the LH "to solve problems in practical terms", and can even help prevent them from emerging in the first place. It is through the loss of meaning, and the loss of value, that we become more vulnerable. (Zak Stein has a considerable body of work addressing some of this.)
 
An objection one may raise is that all these metaphors are actually confusing the issue with a profusion of empty and misleading signifiers, the unfortunate legacy of Platonic or Kantian metaphysics. And it would be better if those were altogether avoided. On the one hand I might agree, because if no loss or separation had occurred, and our experience were whole, then what possible use could we have for any of these representations? However on the other hand, to describe what is lost one cannot avoid the use of signifiers. Now the significance of exchanging one group for another can be a lively terminological dispute, but if all one sees are words, definitions, and paragraphs with more text, then it would all be for naught anyway. It wouldn't matter whether we use Greek, German, or Gaelic terms, or none at all. However if one can figuratively 'see through' the words and connect them to aspects of phenomenal experience, then perhaps they might evoke an echo of something we can recognize, something whose loss or fragmentation may be keenly felt. Style will always detract from substance if that is as far as our plane of focus extends. 
 
In short, to talk about whatever it may be that terms like 'values' are referring to, or for that matter any other signifier for something whose absence has been felt, we have to be able to see past the lines between our terms, and to some extent, even between the lines separating cultures. Take for example the (perhaps less controversial) subject of fairies in Scottish mythology. There is some highly regarded scholarship that delves into the psychology of this folklore.* Though it would be easy to summarily dismiss entire fields of investigation such as this, cultural folklore often contains a lot of wisdom that is capable of opening our eyes to things we wouldn't otherwise be aware of. In the same way, we might view all of philosophy as the cultural folklore that we provisionally use, replete with figurative language about life, all while knowing full well that we continuously supplement and/or replace vast portions of this interdependent network of linguistic tools with oftentimes still more richly patterned figurative representations. But we are resigned to talking about the fairies and other wood folk that dwell in the garden. Now overhearing our conversation many people might laugh and say we are stupid and foolish, but those who know we aren't really talking about fairies will understand. As it is only accessible through the indirect approach of metaphor, meaning is often seen through and embedded within a contextualizing mythos. 
 
*Reference: According to Alastair McIntosh, in the Gaelic world 'fairy' is understood as a metaphor for, or being about ways of 'seeing into' and talking about, the imagination. Scottish scholarship takes this symbolic way of speaking very seriously, and one might even say it is an indigenous way of talking about the RH. The book "Scottish Fairy Belief" was written by Lizanne Henderson and Edward Cowan, the late professor of Scottish history at Glasgow University."
 
[Ellis' pragmatic description, wherein the function of the RH is primarily just to "provide new meaning resources and alerts us to new information that the LH can then investigate", ignores the capacity of the RH to connect us to the terrain of life and living, that "presencing" aspect. This leans toward a somewhat utilitarian understanding of the hemisphere hypothesis. Recall earlier Ellis had said "I don't think we can have any access to the terrain-in-itself", this seemed to back away from his earlier statement about the two kinds of meaning and our access to embodied and associative meaning. However below he reconfirms his earlier statement by noting it was only representational meaning (aka propositional revelations) that we don't have access to.]
 
Robert Ellis: "I think you're still misunderstanding my assumptions, which are only fully fleshed out in my books. I may not have understood your summary of the first: "(1) the inability of the RH to 'presence to' the terrain or anything like value, meaning, and purpose": if by 'presence to' you mean 'offer propositional revelations about', then I agree it's unable, but the RH nevertheless offers all the sources of value, meaning and purpose from experience. So does 'presence' as a verb mean experience, or the representation of that experience in propositions? "(2) the perception that the only possible way of thinking about them is literal, by definition" is definitely *not* what I think - I think the opposite, in fact. We can think about things in ways that are appreciative of meaning without believing in them, and that's exactly where, indeed, philosophy can play the same role as folklore (I agree with you there). We can explore metaphorical constructions in all the arts and in religion. We can also talk about possible beliefs hypothetically, and about beliefs we do hold but provisionally. Then of course we can hold beliefs absolutely or metaphysically. Only the last of these is completely 'literal' in the sense of entirely representational, but provisional belief occurs in a representational frame that is contextualized by an awareness of alternative possibilities other than the mere acceptance or negation of the 'literal' belief.
 
"To describe what is lost one cannot avoid the use of signifiers" I agree, but those signifiers can (and need to be) used provisionally: that is, with a wider contextualization of the meaning of what is discussed in awareness. That's what I meant by the practical necessity of using the LH. Perhaps this is also what you mean by 'seeing through'. I also agree that the imagination has a vital role - one of providing meaning resources to maintain provisionality, and also one of inspiration.
 
Coming back to the end of your first paragraph, though, the implication of this is not at all that "the RH cannot access nor offer anything at all". On the contrary, the RH offers us everything that is worth anything, that is not just hollow verbiage and evil manipulation. The problem isn't about what the RH offers us, nor about its "unifying and integrating capacity", but of how we communicate about what we think it is offering us, and whether we try to do so in the absolute terms that are the hallmark of the over-dominant LH. When we talk about the RH 'revealing' things, in the position McGilchrist has reached, this seems to merely be a way of creating absolute claims out of it. Absolute metaphysical claims, once produced, are so deep in the LH that they are immune to the RH perspective - we cannot modify them or contextualize them, or use them provisionally or 'see through' them as you put it, but have to merely accept them or reject them. Do you really not see how sad and ironic a reversal that is?"

[This puts the finger on figurative thinking, about which there is a clear difference between us. Whereas Ellis states "we have to accept or reject" metaphysics, I am suggesting metaphysics is inherently figurative when viewed from the RH, and it is inherently literal when viewed from the LH. In other words, it's the 'how' not the 'what'. Whereas Ellis is saying that some 'whats', such as metaphysics in this case, are able to override any 'how' by which they are approached. ...Seeing no consilience here, I returned to and restated the "McGilchrist compass" as the point of agreeement between us.]

Seventh Topic: McGilchrist Compass (redux), and conclusion
 
I replied: "Thanks for the clarifications. It might be helpful to describe a sort of practice, the results arrived at through its application, and what can be said concerning them. We might say that, to the extent McGilchrist is promoting any metaphysical claims, these are supposedly derived from his metatheory (the hemisphere hypothesis). This 'theory about theories' suggests that you can see the signature (hallmark, imprint, etc.) of a certain hemisphere in any theory or worldview. It follows that "without wishing to discount [any] of them altogether, we can make a shrewd assessment of which we ought to prefer" (TMWT). In other words, "we can make weighted decisions about which, of any two paths, is likely to prove in the long run more veridical, more helpful".
 
So rather than suggesting "a way of creating absolute claims" out of what the RH reveals, it may be more accurate to say he is suggesting a method for recognizing differences between opposing claims that are provisionally held, differences that correspond to hemispheric asymmetries. It's a comparative, possibly 'incremental', exercise for contextualizing and evaluating new propositions, as well as claims already on offer. The second half of TMWT is a sustained exercise (hubristic to be sure) wherein he tries to apply this and mediate between the vast array of scientific and philosophical claims. Clearly not everyone will agree with the results, which are inevitably going to be bound by the limitations of the individual and the context in which the exercise is carried out. The method itself is insightful, but the more hands it is placed in, the more reliable the results will be
 
Thomas Ellison's charitable critique was "the author has blindspots that might otherwise be made visible and repaired if he were to open up parts of his thinking that have not yet come to fully accept his own conclusions." Now, one of those conclusion is that "relations precede relata". That would suggest that a sustained application of this 'McGilchrist compass' would elevate associative meaning over the essential meaning of conventional Platonic metaphysics [McGilchrist's caveat: "Without, of course, wishing to discount either of them altogether."] as associative relations are (somewhat paradoxically) that which is "essential to the phenomenon". Surely many similar implications could be drawn out."
 
Robert Ellis: “"To the extent that McGilchrist is promoting any metaphysical claims..."?!!! Hm, well, let me quote you the recent summary of all the metaphysical claims in TMWT by David McIlroy that was recently circulated by Perspectiva (perhaps you saw this). So, this is not my interpretation or my summary, but a mainstream view of what McGilchrist is saying that is being actively promoted by his publishers:
 
1. Relationships are ontologically primary, foundational; and ‘things’ a secondary, emergent property of relationships.
2. Matter is an aspect of consciousness, not consciousness an emanation from matter.
3. Individuation is a natural process, whose aim is to enrich rather than to disrupt wholeness.
4. Apparent opposites are not as far as possible removed from one another but tend to coincide.
5. Change and motion are the universal norm, but do not disrupt stability and duration.
6. Nothing is wholly determined, though there are constraints, and nothing is wholly random, though chance plays an important creative role.
7. The whole cosmos is creative; it drives towards the realisation of an infinite potential.
8. Nature is our specific home in the cosmos from which we come and to which in time we return.
9. The world absolutely cannot be properly understood or appreciated without imagination and intuition, as well as reason and science: each plays a vitally important role.
10. The world is neither purposeless nor unintelligent, but simply beyond our full comprehension. The world is more a dance than an equation.
11. At the core of the world is something we call the divine, which is itself forever coming into being along with the world that it forms, and by which, in turn, it too is formed.
 
Of course, if you really want to, it's possible to bend over backwards to make a highly charitable reading, and pretend that he isn't really saying any of these things. But we're not just dealing with a personal conversation with him here: this is big public stuff, influencing a lot of people, and already having political influence as well as steering the wider intellectual climate. It's what he's taken to be saying that's most important in the long run. There's a point where one needs to stand up in clear opposition to serious and influential errors, rather than obfuscating or merely being nice.”
 
I replied: "Yeah, I wasn't overly impressed with McIlroy's denatured "distillation" of TMWT either. And to further support your point, not everyone will view his list within the larger context of his article. It can easily become "copypasta". Interpretation and contextualization are very important. Taking McGilchrist's lead, there may be something to say for advancing simultaneously along at least two separate tracks: one more charitable and the other more critical, so long as each is sufficiently contextualized. Another reason why I think your perspective is valuable. There is the potential for, and actual instances of, misappropriation to consider, including by his own hands. Yes, "one needs to stand up in clear opposition to serious and influential errors''. 
 
My similar perception, in regard to Akomolafe, is what motivated the original post. But there is also a lot of potential there. Those who can 'move the needle', by introducing a new paradigm, or holding up a new lens through which to view our contemporary predicament, or more fundamentally, by simply reminding us that we already have a compass by which to orient, are thinkers to attend to, engage with, and criticize."
 
[It's not so much 'what' that metaphorical compass reveals as 'how' it reveals, though what it reveals is of course very important too. From McIlroy's article: "Our dependence on metaphors reveals our need for myths and for metaphysics. “Just as there is no option to think without metaphor, there is no such thing as not having a myth” (TMWT Epilogue p.1330). “[U]ltimate meaning will always lie beyond what reason can conceive or everyday language express.” (TMWT, ch.14 p.569)." I alluded to an elision of metaphor and metaphysics above in my comparison of fairies, folklore, and philosophy. However, whereas figurative thinking helps us compare and contextualize to see past the words, the denaturing process of metaphysics (as absolute claims) means that this sort of thinking will be of no help unless it is re-contextualized. However this is, as mentioned, categorically impossible for Ellis. Like any other abstract LH representation, metaphysics must be recontextualized via the interhemispheric dialectic.
 
Much of what we talked about could be applied to religious exegesis, as I'm sure you can see. For Ellis, one might say that there will be no metaphysical fairy talk, or more charitably, at least no ambiguity when it does happen. Ellis seems to strive for a high degree of specificity in what cannot be avoided, and for the elimination of what can be avoided. Like Akomolafe, he has an admirable allegiance to embodied and associative meaning, but a collapsed ontology that lacks a metaphorical language for depth. In contrast, McGilchrist wants to walk with us "on the hills and the mountains" of the terrain so we can see "new vantage points continually open around us". His literary and mythopoetic background supplies the metaphorical virtuosity (with depth of significance and meaning) that allows him to advocate for the world of the RH, without collapsing it entirely (Akomolafe) or suggesting access to depth is practically unintelligible (Ellis).]

Bonus eighth topic: Truth

See "The Roots of Postmodernism: Schelling, Process Philosophy and Poststructuralism" by Arran Gare:

"Whitehead accepted that there is more to the world than will ever be grasped by language, criticised the tendency to take abstractions for reality (the “fallacy of misplaced concreteness”), and accorded a primary role to metaphors in thought, language, philosophy and science... [He] called for the production of a diversity of metaphysical schemes. While 'we cannot produce that final adjustment of well-defined generalities which constitute a complete metaphysics... we can produce a variety of partial systems of limited generality.' The resulting rival schemes, inconsistent with each other, but each with its own merits and its own failures, will then warn us of the limitations within which our intuitions are hedged. This simultaneously opposes the quest for absolute truth while allowing that understanding can be advanced." 

The question "What is truth?" is at the heart of much of this. At his recent lecture "Dominus Illuminatio Mea: Our Brains, Our Delusions, & the Future of the University", McGilchrist noted: 

"First, to clear away a misconception. In speaking of truth, I want to distance myself equally from two popular false alternatives. On the one hand ‘naive realism’, that there just is a world 'out there' that it's our duty to record passively as if we were Geiger counters or photographic plates, and 'naive idealism', the view that we 'make up' reality and are therefore free to do so in any way we wish. Each of these travesties misses the important perception that truth is an encounter. There is then no one absolute truth about the world that results from every encounter alike. But there are certainly truths - some things we believe to be truer than others. In the humanities we should be used to the idea that truth is of this nature. We speak of a musical performance as truer to its subject than another, a critical interpretation of a work giving a truer account than another, and we expect at least a degree of consensus on the matter among those who know enough to recognize a good interpretation when they hear one. There are very clearly better and worse interpretations. As a critic of Hamlet, no one account is exclusively correct. I could get it indisputably wrong, for example by claiming the play is really an account of peasant life in Azerbaijan in the 10th Century. There being no single fixed truth absolutely does not mean there is no truth. Without truth we would have no reason to do or say anything at all. Even the statement that 'There is no truth' is a truth statement... https://youtu.be/OpCIHhw4i8g?t=1270

If nothing is allowed to correct a theory we're doomed to live by lies. What at first sight may seem paradoxical is that science is threatened both by inappropriate subjectivity on the one hand and by an unsustainable belief in a kind of objectivity that modern physics has long discredited on the other, the kind that assumes that the the knower plays no part whatever in knowledge. Truth is never objective in this artificially limited sense. But important as it is to recognize that fact, it's every bit as important to validate science's attempt to respond fairly and fully to the reality with which it engages. That is where true objectivity lies. https://youtu.be/OpCIHhw4i8g?t=2014

What is Truth

Zak Stein: "If we've been brought to a place where our civilization is about to self-destruct, then how do we learn to perceive what's actually valuable again? Because we're clearly very confused about value. One of the central risks that people don't see, in terms of catastrophic risk, is the collapse of culture, truth, and value." ...So "What is truth?" I tried to succinctly paraphrase that chapter from The Matter with Things:

Truth is a process, not a thing to be possessed but a path to follow. It is intrinsically incomplete and uncertain. Many things – most of the really important things in our lives – can never be proved, but they are nonetheless far from being a matter of individual whim where ‘anything goes’. The ‘antifragile’ idea of proof recognizes that it derives its value from the context, and so can never be absolute or immune from evolution. The brittle, ‘fragile’ idea of truth as independent of us, immutable and certain, is a relatively recent invention. We need to regain the strengths of the former, and lose the weaknesses of the later.
 
Agreement, common ground, can be reached because experience of the world is not random. The pursuit of truth summons a disciplined attentiveness and an open and active receptivity to the task. It is incapable of being encountered except through embodied being, engaged in the world. When one speaks truth, one hopes that people will agree, but they can always find reasons not to agree if they are determined enough not to hear. ‘That’s just your opinion’, people say, with the implication that ‘my opinion is as good as yours’. And, undoubtedly, it may be – or it may not.

That is the point: there is still a structure of better and worse, even where better or worse cannot be finally demonstrated so as to avoid dissent. It is a never-finished seeking after, and evolving of, something that is disclosed by the very process which the ‘game’ of life continues. The predominant views in public debate today – naïve positivism and naïve deconstructionism – are devoid of any sense of a 'continuous process of connection' with the world. The ‘betweenness’, of a web of relationships in which fidelity can operate, has been lost, and with it the configuration of the Gestalt.

Recall the recent Darwin College lecture, where McGilchrist said "the beginning of true knowing is when we recognize how little that we know". But here he's saying "truth is not a free-for-all or matter of individual whim; there is still a structure of better and worse." These two statements seem logically incompatible. If we know very little, then how do we know there is this structure? But I think it is our capacity to hold these apparently opposing insights together that enables "a sense of awe and wonder about the extraordinary, complex, and beautiful cosmos". We should not blind ourselves to the structure of the cosmos on account of our limited understanding (willing ignorance), rather we we must stand in awe before something we can only begin to comprehend (true knowing).

“It is possible to construe both truth and falsehood as having meaning only in relation to assertions in language, but that is to miss their depth" writes McGilchrist in The Matter with Things. Stephen Wolfram recently echoed this problem, "There are axioms at the foundations of mathematics. And given these axioms, you can derive things. And you can say, 'Is this actually true?' Well, if you change the axioms, you might be able to derive it, or you might not be able to derive it. But we're concentrating on what can be derived. You don't have to force yourself into this kind of question of 'What's the logic?', so to speak, because there isn't a logic. It's just, 'What can exist in the world?'" (It's supralogical.)
 
If we only take truth to be a matter of language and logic, then we have already consigned ourselves to a fictional world untethered to reality. "The light dove, cleaving the air in her free flight, and feeling its resistance, might imagine that its flight would be still easier in empty space. It was thus that Plato left the world of the senses", wrote Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason. On the other hand, if we only "pose questions with a hammer" as Nietzsche advised in Twilight of the Idols, then we have limited ourselves to viewing the world through a narrow aperture. Yes, truth is constrained, but it is not constrained by our tools, whether held in the mind or in the hand. So while “we are capable of greater things than we know”, as McGilchrist concluded his Darwin College Lecture, we are not capable of anything whatsoever. We routinely deceive ourselves in such ways however, particularly when we ignore relationships: 
 
"In David Mermin’s model there are only correlations – no correlata. He quotes Christopher Fuchs, Professor of Physics at Boston, as suggesting that the distinction between the ‘many worlds interpretation’ and the ‘correlations without correlata’ position of Mermin is ‘most succinctly expressed by characterizing many worlds as correlata without correlations’ (Mermin 1998). In other words, all betweenness, or configuration of the Gestalt, with no entities to be fixed, in the first case; and all fixed entities, but no betweenness, or Gestalt, arising in the second. This too reflects the difference between right hemisphere and left hemisphere takes on reality, respectively.”
 
It may be obvious that the MWI is an impoverished perspective. Today the erosion of a relational understanding of the world extends into many other areas of life. It is foremost evident in a pervasive denial of limitation. However if we are to realize the promise of "greater things than we know" then we need to have a keen awareness and understanding of limits. Opposing tendencies such as these must be held together, like an alchemical syzygy where “the more intimately they are united, the more, not the less, they are differentiated." Or like an enigmatic koan. When taken together, opposing views can frustrate our narrow logical reasoning and reveal more about what can exist in the world than any internally consistent system of thought ever has. 
 
Robert Ellis objects, noting that, nonetheless, many people still view truth as absolute in structure, in some sense, and nothing like this at all. It's true. But it's also worth noting: that is by no means a necessary nor universally held perspective (CS Peirce being one example). There are several ways we might try to address this. We could try to clearly define all our terms according to some system (a system orientation). Or, we could try to distinguish between phenomenological perspectives upon that to which the terms refer (a presentation orientation). The latter approach is the one being used here. Audre Lorde wrote "Master's Tools Will Never Take Down the Master's House". Or in Heidegger's words "The evil and thus keenest danger is thinking itself. It must think against itself, which it can only seldom do." Otherwise stated by Buckminster Fuller as “You never change things by fighting the existing reality. To change something, build a new model that makes the existing model obsolete.” Donella Meadows in her "Leverage Points" article says the same thing. And of course, McGilchrist is making his case for an opposing "mode of attention" as well. What lesson should we draw from all this? Don't pick up the same tools without first addressing the higher level dynamics. In this case, that is the phenomenology. Then can we travel downstream to the language, at which point it will have already taken on a different cast of meaning: from thing to process, from absolute to provisional, from more literal to more figurative. But if the higher dynamics remain unchanged, if we don't step outside of those, then the existing regime will inevitably reassert itself and reinforce the same patterns as before, washing away any temporary gains that can be made by lower level reforms to the system of words. "Truth" would remain precisely what those naïve deconstructionists suspected all along: a mere instrument for concentrating power and control.